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ABSTRACT
By the beginning of the Third Millennium, donors reassessed the aid architecture and
adopted a new aid regime based on the partnership principles to attain poverty
reduction. Harmonization is one of core principles to increase aid effectiveness
because it has potential benefits for donors through minimizing transaction costs and
for recipient countries by improving the predictability of budget aid. However,
empirical studies and international reports showed that the degree of harmonization is
limited. The thesis attempts to explore the possible causes behind limited progress in
this principle between 2005 and 2010 through comparing aid policies of two main
donor countries in Africa: The United Kingdom and Demark towards Tanzania and
Ghana.
The thesis finds that the British and Danish aid polices as declared have been affected
by Paris principles; nevertheless, their harmonized operations have been conducted on
multilateral manner. On the recipient side, the adequate capabilities of Ghanaian
governments in addition to the availability of natural resources have enabled the
governments to employ harmonized aid while Tanzanian governments have not been
able to enhance the degree of harmonization.
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INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
Foreign aid simply resembles a mutual relation between donors and recipients.
According to donor, it is an effective tool to achieve foreign policy goals and from
recipients' perspectives, it is an important source of financing development projects
and programs. The aid architecture* institutionalized after the Second World War
through Bretton Woods Institutions; nevertheless, with the beginning of the third
millennium, donors reassessed the aid architecture and adopted a new architecture
based on the notion of partnership. Partnership has been developed to regulate the
relation between donors and recipients on the base of reciprocity and it is interpreted
in Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005. The declaration sets five
"Partnership Commitments" that became a procedural framework on aid effectiveness
and donors attained to meet all partnership commitments by 2010; thus a survey on
monitoring the Paris Declaration was conducted before the meeting of high level
forum on aid effectiveness in South Korea in November 2011. The survey shows
modest performance from donors. A significant progress is reported just in the fourth
principle "managing for result" in addition to major reforms occurred in recipient
countries regarding formulating development policies and financial structure.
Regarding the third principle "harmonization"; it is related to ownership and
alignment principles because attaining harmonization in terms of less proliferation,
less duplication and transparency means step forward to achieve benefits of the other
two principles. The aforementioned survey shows that donors succeeded in achieving

*

The International Development Association (IDA) in the World Bank (2007) identifies aid
architecture as ‘the set of rules and institutions governing aid flows to developing countries' p.1
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one indicator of aid harmonization which is technical cooperation; however, other
indicators such as the uses of program-based approach, the coordination of donor
missions and analytic works have not been accomplished yet.
In this context, the main research question of the thesis is "what are the possible
causes behind the limited progress in implementing the principle of
harmonization between 2005 and 2010 by comparing aid policies of two donor
countries (United Kingdom and Demark) towards two African countries
(Tanzania and Ghana)". And this question shall be answered through examining
and analyzing the following items:
-

The scope and degree of each donor's commitment to the international and
regional initiatives on aid effectiveness.

-

The similarities and differences in aid harmonization between the two donors
in the two recipient countries.

-

The role of recipient countries in endorsing aid harmonization.

Review of the literature
Literature on aid harmonization might be divided into two categories: the first
category discuses aid coordination as one aspect of aid effectiveness and tackles it in
the volume included the various principles of aid effectiveness; while the second
category focuses on imperatives of aid coordination.
Regarding the literature that handles aid harmonization generally, Owen Barder
(2006) affirmed that foreign aid has actually achieved notable growth in developing
countries. However, he urged that increasing aid to the poorest countries to attain
millennium development goals (MDGs) might lead to negative impacts because of
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three types of constrains: micro economic (ex. transactional costs), macroeconomic
(ex. Dutch Diseases) and political economy (ex. corruption). Barder concluded that to
overcome those constraints, donor ought to coordinate their aid policies and direct
their disbursement to government budget in order to limit duplication and
proliferation. William Easterly (2006) in his well known book "The White Man's
Burden: Why the west's efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill and so little good"
criticized donors polices because donors used to handle developing countries'
problems as technical problems (planners' approach) and they ignored the specificity
of each country. Thus he urged that donors ought to indicate their foreign aid policy
according to (searchers' approach) because poverty is a multi dimensional problem.
On the other hand, there are literature that tackled harmonization through certain
approach and I will refer only to two of these approaches; the first is the institutional
approach, Gibson,Clark, et al.(2005) analyzed aid effectiveness in term of incentives
within institutions in donor and recipient countries. The main argument is that
incentives within institutional process might foster or hinder effectiveness of
development aid. Authors examined perverse incentives in collective action situations
on individual, national, and international levels. For donors, the collective action
problems that mitigate aid effectiveness are informational problems and other
problems caused by insufficient institutions. It's worth to mention that the
informational problems includes lack of asymmetric information about the
characteristics of each community and these problems occur when the donor countries
do not recognize or appreciate local knowledge so that aid is not delivered to the real
beneficiaries. While problems of insufficient institutions are related to adopting new
rules, rent seeking, and corruption; and these problems take place in both donor and
recipient countries and lead to unproductive outcomes.
9

Principal – agent setting is the second approach; AlessiaIsopi and George Mavrotas
(2009) explored determinants of aid allocation and found out that some donors
allocate aid for the poorest and others according to the performance of recipient. In
addition, the authors investigated policy coherence in donor country and whether
donors adopt aid policy corresponded with trade policy.
On the other side, African intellectuals have tackled aid effectiveness with the
ultimate goal of ending aid therefore the point of departure is redefiniting the concept
of development. Samir Amin (2009) one of dependency theorists argues that to end
aid dependency, African countries have to reorient the definition and indicators of
development. First Amin questions the legitimacy of international institutions that
governed aid disbursements from the North to the South, namely the OECD, the EU,
the WB as they represent donor countries he described them 'tried states' as they share
same liberal globalization economically and politically and that mirrored in their aid
agenda. Therefore, he believes that the UN General Assembly is the legitimate organ
to formulate and monitor aid relations. On the other side, Amin criticized two trends
in the international aid discourse: aid volume and aid performance. Regarding aid
volume; Amin argues that global aid should be transferred according to the 'capacity
of absorption' not the 'political objectives' of donors. Moreover, aid volume should be
measured based on the effectiveness of development strategies that aim to decrease
received amount; accordingly, he calls for abandoning the debate of increasing
international commitment of aid volume from 0.7% to 1% of GNI. Concerning aid
performance, Amin suggests that it has to be evaluated not only by the indicators of
growth; employment and the production system but by 'aid ability of its own
redundancy' as well. Therefore, he described the indicators were set in the Paris
Declaration as 'a jungle of 12 (illegible) performance matrices and a rating system
10

inspired by the used for the solvability of banks. This procedure is no doubt attractive
to bureaucrats but it is certainly useless for the rest of us' (p. 62).
The African scholar Yash Tandon (2009) argues in his book 'Ending Aid Dependence'
that development not aid is the core concept that recipient countries have to define it.
He defined development as a combine of social factor and democratic factor with
exclusion of imperial factor. In this regard, Tandon is inspired by Nyerere's approach
that is built on participating of all national segments in the society; in addition to self
reliance. According to this definition, terms of growth and wealth are not components
in development. Tondon identifies five causes of aid dependency: 1) the structure of
international system that has gone from colonial powers and colonies then developed
and developing countries and the international organizations support this dichotomy.
2) Everlasting financial and social impediments in African countries limit their ability
to reproduce alternative development resources.3) aid readiness, acquiring aid
disbursements is easier than mobilizing national resources. 4) 'A psychology of aid
dependency' in the South is combined with weak and corrupted institutions and
absence of leadership. 5) In the situation of refusing aid by the South leaders, they
have been blamed by donors and media that they are working against national interest
in eradicating poverty.
However, Tim Murithi (2009) believes that international aid architecture is the second
face of colonization because it is built on liberal economic policies as a result it is
used to

manipulate, control and coerce the recipient into fulfilling the donor's

agenda' (p.3). On the other side, Murithi blames political elite in African countries
because they became 'addicted to donors fund' gradually governments have not been
able to operate their functions in development planning and resources allocation due
to corruption.
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Furthermore, Murithi criticized donors' discourses regarding the notion of aid
effectiveness, he argues that this notion focuses on procedures and discards the real
function of aid which is achieving impact. Also attaining MDGs by 2015 is not a
reachable goal because poverty indicators and statistics still show the miserable
reality of African population.
The second category of literature undertakes aid harmonization separately; it
examines problems that occurred due to aid fragmentation. Maija HalonenAkatwijuka (2004) explained causes of coordination failure; they argued that when
donors have similar preferences, coordination would be deterred because they direct
their disbursements to the same sectors. in addition, asymmetries of information
among donors themselves lead to concentrate aid allocation on one sector and lower
priority sectors do not get disbursements; on the other hand, donors prefers to direct
aid to social sector not public expenditure due to seeking visibility.
Aid proliferation is another cause of fragmentation; Iñaki Aldasoro. et al., (2009)
argued that the most of donors on real field do not implement aid concentration to
ultimate aid outcomes though they declared their commitment to aid effectiveness.
Through empirical investigation, authors found that few donors specialize in certain
sector and decrease its proliferation thus they concluded that it is difficult to apply
coordination. To limit aid proliferation; Jacky Amprou.et al. (2005) argued that
donors have to select recipient countries. Authors demonstrate various types of
criteria to select and limit proliferation corresponding with objectives of aid allocation
(ex. alleviate poverty, economic growth, democracy and human rights); indeed,
characteristics of recipient (its economic vulnerability, status of conflict) could be
determinants of selectivity. They concluded that donors have to agree on common
criteria of selectivity besides the criteria of each donor; where donors should share
12

their criteria to ensure better aid allocation. While ArnabAcharyaa. et al.(2006)
focused on the problem of transactions costs; they argued that increasing aid
proliferation leads to increase transactions costs. They explored determinants of aid
allocation or allocation pattern of major donors and they developed index to measure
proliferation. They found that aid proliferation increased transactions because each
project needs separate negotiations and tools of management such as financial
arrangements, phases of monitoring, and indirect costs. On the other hand,
expenditures of activities such as training and lack of responsibility of recipients
cause transaction costs.
Yutaka Arimoto and Hisaki Kono,(2009) shed the light on recurrent costs as a
another problem of aid fragmentation, as they argued that less proliferation have
positive impacts on development because donors specify aid allocation and that will
decrease recurrent cost for recipient country but what happened in the reality that
donors allocate aid and recurrent cost separately. Authors recommended that donors
have to allocate aid to national budget to reduce aid ineffectiveness.
Though the mainstream of literature on aid effectiveness argues for the importance of
aid harmonization, some scholars claimed that coordination among donors makes aid
outcome unproductive. Karl R. Pedersen (2001) and Gaute Torsvik (2005) argued that
though donors aim to alleviate poverty, aid flows in cooperative way might lead to
counter results and lead to more poverty. Their explanation is that recipient countries
depend heavily on donors, who "crowdedly" support poor and they carry out activities
that eradicate poverty while recipient countries do less effort to overcome poverty so
the domestic policies would not work effectively. Pedersen argues that applying
conditionality could not prevent recipient from this behavior because "altruistic"
donor do not intervene in domestic policies and in distribution of income in particular.
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Accordingly, author concluded that it is important to reconsider incentives of recipient
countries. On the contrary, Torsvik argued that conditions might be a good solution
and he urged that donors should enforce contingent aid contracts as the relation
between donor and recipient is a principal – agent relation.
Statement of Need
From the above-mentioned literature review, it is clear that scholars handled causes of
aid fragmentation separately; not through comprehensive analysis because the most of
the studies are empirical and the unit of analysis is aid agency. Furthermore, the most
of studies that conducted in the BWIs and in the West have considered the eight goals
of the millennium are the only indicators of development. So scholars have tackled
aid effectiveness from this scope though they believe that the needs and milieu of
poor countries are different and countries require various types and scopes of
intervention. On the contrary, African scholars do not consider the concept of aid
effectiveness because they argue for aid independency. Therefore, they have refuted
the definition and measures of development that evolved by BWIs. Moreover, there
are limited analytical studies that investigated the role of the recipient in aid
management. Accordingly, the thesis will start from identifying boundaries of the
concept of harmonization, then it will explore motives of aid harmonization and the
country's aid policy will be the unit of analysis; also this study aspires to investigate
how the capacity of recipient countries affects the degree of harmonization.
Theoretical Framework
There are various reasons to explain why donors allocate aid to developing countries;
the architecture of foreign aid became a determinant of aid allocation policy with the
beginning of the third millennium and the thesis will focus on this determinant.
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Regarding donors' motives, Mark McGillivray et al. (2002) determined three major
motives: political, commercial and development. Their empirical study that
investigated the behavior of four donors (France, U.K, USA, and Japan) from 1977 to
1997 showed that political and economic interests not development needs compelled
donors' aid policy. Riddell,R. (2007) added five motives: emergency, solidarity,
historical ties, providing public good and promoting human rights. Javed Younas
(2008) Kim Richard Nossal (1988) also mentioned in their studies those motives.
While Dane Rowlands and Ian Ketcheson (2002) in discussing Canadian aid policy;
they stated that altruism, bureaucratic influence, responsive of recipient country affect
donor aid allocation policy. What is important in their study that they adopted the
systemic determinant "that looks at the role other donors plays in shaping ODA
policy, either through the sharing of information, strategic competition, or the
outright coordination of aid flows" (P.29).
Concerning the rise of architecture of foreign aid as a determinant of aid allocation, it
could be noted that there is a consensus in aid literature on the substantial change in
aid structure. Rosalind Eyben et al. (2004) and J.Brian Atwood (2011) used the term
of "the Millennium Aid Consensus" which aims to eradicate multi-dimensional
poverty through adopting principles of ownership, coordination, and a comprehensive
global policy to eradicate poverty. Stijn Claessens et al. (2007) in their empirical
study on aid policies of 22 donors and 147 recipient countries from 1970 till 2004,
they claimed that there was a significant change in aid architecture after the end of the
cold war; as donors directed their disbursements for development goals mainly to
improve economic conditions through debt relief and implementing poverty reduction
strategy. David Dollar and Victoria Levin (2006) also concluded from their empirical
study that donors after the end of the cold war directed their aid disbursements to
15

selected countries that adopted democratic policies. Alastair Fraser and Lindsay
Whitﬁeld. (2009) also affirmed that new aid era is built on poverty reduction objective
though they did not think that partnership and ownership principals are totally
embedded in aid policies.
This clear claim in aid literature is combined by global initiatives trying to guarantee
aid effectiveness; the Paris Declaration in 2005 was followed by Accra Agenda for
Action (AAA) in 2008; the World Bank released in 2009 the Legal Harmonization
Initiative (LHI) to provide donors and recipients with legal tools to harmonize their
policies and OECD established "The Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF)"
to monitor donor practices and their commitments to Paris principals. All those
initiatives have set indicators to measure donors' commitments.
Regarding aid harmonization, Paris declaration set three indicators: 1- establishing
common arrangement in planning, managing, delivering aid; 2- simplifying
procedures and 3- sharing information for transparency (Paul Balogun, 2005).
Paolo de Renzio et al.(2005) measured harmonization through incentives; he
mentioned three different contexts of incentives: 1- within aid agency; 2- among aid
agencies 3- and between donor and partner government. Then he determined three
levels of incentives: political; institutional; and individual incentives.
Based on literature review, I noted that the majority of studies are empirical studies
and tackle aid harmonization on micro level "aid agency" as authors demonstrated
how the institutional aspects might foster or hinder aid coordination. Therefore, I
argue that the aid policies that drown by donor governments play a major role in
determining the degree of harmonization so I will use "state" as the unit of analysis
not aid agency as demonstrated in the most of literature. Furthermore, I argue that
16

dynamics of aid architecture is an important incentive of donor countries to allocate
aid. Accordingly, I will use the framework that is developed by Arne Disch (1999)
that assesses aid coordination by four dimensions:
•

Degrees of Coordination; it measures the degree of the donor's commitment;
which is categorized in three sub level:
-

Consultation: this is the minimum level of coordination as donors just
share information

-

Cooperation: this is a higher level, and usually is applied in emergency
level as donors harmonize their policies.

-

Collaboration: the highest level of coordination when they develop a
commitment on the field with what they agreed regarding procedures.

•

Content of Coordination: there are three types of coordination:
-

Coordination on policies, principles and priorities; here donors build
consensus on their aid activities.

-

Coordination on procedures; donors agree on procedures of aid delivery on
the financial scale (ex. accounting and auditing) and the political scale (ex.
policy dialogue).

-

Coordination on practices; when donor agencies share information and
experiences on the field of work.

•

Geographic/Regional Coordination when donor countries divide their
activities (division of labor) within geographic areas.

•

Functional Coordination when each donor provides its aid to sector that it has
advantage in it.

Disch applied this framework on Norwegian aid policies; I urge this is an appropriate
framework to measure the scope and degree of harmonization between U.K and
17

Denmark towards Ghana and Tanzania; because, it focuses on donors' policies not
technical procedures in aid agencies.
Hypotheses
The argument of the thesis is based on two hypotheses:
-

The foreign aid architecture became a main determinant of aid
harmonization.

-

Policies and the capacity of recipient countries might affect the scope and
degree of aid harmonization.

Method of the Research
A. Specify countries selection
United Kingdom and Denmark are selected as donors, where I shall investigate their
aid policies regarding harmonization. It's worth to mention that aid policies of both
donors have developed differently in terms of history, institution and objectives; U.K
unlike Denmark has historical ties with most of the countries in the African continent
as a colonial power. Since 1997 the U.K has declared that aid policy would target
poverty reduction (Owen Barder, 2006). However, Danish development aid
assistances started in 1971 and motivated by being a welfare state that has a moral
obligation towards poor countries (Lars Engberg-Pedersen, 2009).
On the other hand, Denmark achieved the international commitment of allocating
0.7% of total GNI in 1985 (Lars Engberg-Pedersen, 2009); while U.K in 2010
claimed that it aims to meet this target by 2013 (DFID website).
However; both of U.K and Denmark has visions regarding aid harmonization and
both have released various initiatives and white papers in order to ensure aid
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effectiveness. Furthermore, U.K and Denmark are among 10 top donors for Ghana
and Tanzania in the last 5 years (OECD/DAC database, aidflows website).
Regarding recipient countries; Tanzania and Ghana was colonized by Britain; both of
them were ruled by national leaders (Julius Nyerere and Kwame Nkrumah,
respectively) who were against Western intervention in the African countries and had
a comprehensive development vision; however, their development plans failed
because of various reasons and economic dysfunctions in the seventies which pushed
these political regimes at that time to depend on foreign assistances. Ghana and
Tanzania achieved significant growth after adopting structural adjustment programs;
Benno J. Ndulu et al. (2007) stated that they were among top reformist countries from
1995 to 2004.
In Tanzania and Ghana, the percentage of net Official Development Assistances
(ODA) has been over 30 per capita since 2000 and it reached to 66% in 2009
(OECD/DAC database, 2011)
The relation between Tanzania and donors faced a challenge in 1990 and as a result of
that; Tanzania restructured in 1995 its relation with donors on basis of ownership
(Fraser, 2008). Consequently, Tanzania was the first African country that adopted
partnership principles and I argue that this experience might affect the degree of
harmonization. On the other side, Ghanaian government declared that it aims to be a
middle income country and less dependent on foreign aid by 2015. (Ghana Joint
Assistance Strategy, 2007).
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B. Specify kinds of data:
The study concentrates on ODA or government-to-government aid. My analysis will
depend on gross ODA disbursements that aggregated OECD. Additionally, I will use
global and regional initiatives on aid harmonization besides white papers released by
donors and reports conducted by recipient countries.
Regarding the timeframe, it will focus on the time frame determined by Paris
Declaration starting by 2005 and targeting the year of 2010 to attain the five
partnership commitments. Nevertheless, the study will explore aid policies of donor
and recipient countries before 2005 to investigate the change before and after Paris
Declaration.
Thesis Outline
The thesis will divide into three chapters:
-

The first chapter will illustrate the development of the notion of
harmonization by examining international and regional declarations.

-

The second chapter will demonstrate aid policies including harmonization
of the UK and Denmark in addition to their strategy to Africa.

-

The third chapter will discuss development strategies of Tanzania and
Ghana and their management of aid disbursements
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CHAPTER I
AID EFFECTIVENESS: INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL SCOPES
This chapter will demonstrate firstly the change in aid architecture, when the
economic and political conditionality was the fundamental determinant of aid
allocation then in the third millennium aid is allocated according to the principle of
partnership. After that the chapter will explore the principle of harmonization in the
international and regional declarations.
1.1 Foreign aid from conditionality to partnership
Aid architecture has undergone two major changes since the institutionalization of the
flow of foreign aid after the Second World War. The first change occurred when
BWIs and donor agencies applied aid conditionality through Structure Adjustment
Programs (SAPs) in the 1980s. The second change appeared in the beginning of the
third millennium when BWIs adopted the notion of partnership in their development
policies. Donor agencies and BWIs have justified these changes by seeking economic
progress in poor countries and aid effectiveness but in reality these changes were a
direct response to economic crises accompanied by changes in ideology and premises
of donors.
1.1.1. The first change: Structure Adjustment Programs (SAPs)
Before implementing Structure Adjustment Programs in the 1980s, the international
economy was challenged by a couple of turmoil changes. First; the oil price shocks
that took place in 1973 and 1979, where the increment of oil prices realized an
increase in commodity prices that in turn escalated external dept of poor countries
(Graham Harrison, 2004 & Howard Stein, 2008). Second, which is more important, is
21

the dollar devolution. This factor had a major reflect on the international economy.
Initially, the collapse of fixed exchange rates system, companied with the excessive
fluctuation in IMF monetary policies that aimed to maintain exchange rates and
balance of payments of its member countries in a stable form. Moreover; this was
followed by the upraise of interest rates that stimulated a recession in the international
economy (Harrison, 2004 & Alastair Fraser, 2009.)
These economic changes coincided with the change in the role of the state. As after
the dominance of the United States of America on the international economic
dynamics upon the dollar devolution besides Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990) and
Ronald Regan (1981-1989) policies, Western countries adopted the legacy of minimal
state intervention in development process to cope up with neoliberal policies (Roland
Rich, 2004) and abandoned the state–led economy approach. Therefore; these
economic and political changes endorsed neoliberalism that emphasize on
stabilization through trade liberalization, privatization and minimal state intervention
to achieve growth and development.
Consequently; BWIs formulated Structure Adjustment Programs (SAPs) drawn from
the neoliberal polices to manage dept crisis in developing countries stimulated from
peck of oil prices and recession in donor countries. Meanwhile, the World Bank in
particular proclaimed aid inflow would be on condition that recipients would apply
neoliberal policies: cut public expenditures, raise interest rate, reduce trade barriers
and tariffs, and privatization (John Pender, 2001 &Asad Ismi, 2004). Robert
McNamara the president of World Bank Group stated in his speech in 1979 “In order
to benefit fully from an improved trade environment the developing countries will
need to carry out structural adjustments favoring their export sectors. I would urge
that the international community consider sympathetically the possibility of additional
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assistance to developing countries that undertake the needed structural adjustment for
export promotion in line with their long-term comparative advantages” (quoted from
Stein, 2008, p.31). Additionally; the World Bank published a report entitled
"Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An agenda for action" in 1981,
which is known "Berg Report". This report pointed out that the cause of poor
performance of African economy - though they received large amounts of aid - is the
unsound policies in some sectors and the economy as a whole. Therefore the report
asked the donors' agencies to transfer aid to African countries which applied real
economic and sector reforms.
Additionally, political conditionality was applied in the 1990s as a respond to change
in the international system after the collapse of the Soviet Union and its
consequences. Therefore, Western countries imposed political conditionality
(implementing democratic and human rights procedures) to counter the political
instability in Eastern Europe and civil wars that erupted in developing countries
(Thomas Carothers, 1999& Elling Tjonneland, 1998).
1.1.2. The second change: participatory approach
Since the beginning of the third millennium, BWIs have been advocating for
partnership and ownership as core concepts to achieve growth and development.
Hence; they asserted that aid delivery should be dependent on these concepts. In
reality; the notion of partnership was adopted after the failure of SAPs and the
eruption of debt crisis in developing countries that applied neo liberal policies.
Furthermore; the success of East Asian countries questioned the legacy of minimal
state intervention in the development process.
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The prescription of BWIs neither has achieved growth nor stability in developing
countries that implemented SAPs. Asad Ismi (2004) asserted in the report
"Impoverishing a Continent: The World Bank and the IMF in Africa" deadly impacts
of SAPs in Sub Saharan Africa. He pointed out that during the 1980s GDP cut down
by 15% and per capita income felled by 25% where people living below the poverty
line exceeded half of Africa's population. Moreover, external debt increased by more
than 500% as 33 of the countries that applied SAPs became heavily indebted
countries. Furthermore; Mexico, which adopted neoliberal polices and then it was
considered one of the successful stories became heavily an indebted country and faced
the threat of bankrupt (Pender, 2001).
Beside the economic setbacks in developing countries after implementing SAPs, East
Asian countries appeared as a miracle in achieving development (Pender, 2001). The
state in East Asian countries played an interventionist role and public sector was an
engine of the development process. This successful role of state to achieve growth and
development pushed the World Bank to retreat the Western premise regarding the role
of state. In 1997 the World Bank published its annual report under the title of "The
State in Changing World". In this report the World Bank affirmed that state plays
essential role in delivering goods and services and enriching market dynamics.
The failure of foundation and policies of SAPs coincided with criticism from
international agencies (Erik Thorbecke, 2000). In 1987, UNICEF published a study
entitled Adjustment with Human Face. This study claimed that SAPs led to miserable
impacts on the poor people because of the cut in public expenditures. So, it called for
maintaining social expenditures and applying social protection policies targeting
vulnerable people (David A. Smith, 1989.)
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On the other hand, the Western agencies and literatures revised economic
conditionality and BWIs deep intervention in developing countries that adopted SAPs.
The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of OCED claimed in their meeting
on 3-4 May 1995 that '… Development and greater interdependence require high
levels of domestic effort, high standards of accountability, and a strong civil society.
Open, participatory economic and political systems are increasingly important
factors' (OECD, 1996, p.19.)
Also, different literatures (Paul Collier et al, 1997, Tony Killick, 2004 &Tito Cordella
and Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, 2002) argued that aid conditionality have rationale
objectives that could accomplish reform in developing countries. Nonetheless, the
way of applying conditionality through SAPs led to the lack of ownership of
recipients' countries in development planning. Paul Collier et. al concluded 'The
attempt to buy policy changes actually exacerbates the problem of lack of ownership
of policies on the part of the government. Without government ownership the
persistence of reform may have insufficient credibility to induce a strong supply
response.' (Collier et al, 1997, p. 1406.)

To sum up, adopting aid conditionality through SAPs as a crucial strategy for poor
countries to improve their economies failed to attain growth and stability; above all, it
led to drastic social effects. However, ownership became the key factor to get rid of
deadly impacts of SAPs.

1.1.3 The notion of partnership
Aid conditionality means using aid disbursement as incentives to recipient country to
implement certain policies and that was applied via SAPs. Recipient countries have
been committed to implement neoliberal policies to guarantee sustainability of aid
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inflow. Ravi Kanbur (2000) elaborated that the relation between donor and recipient
is "unitary entities". Accordingly; donors' agencies have intervened in formulating
and implementing aided programs and projects while national needs and priorities of
recipient countries have not been considered thoroughly.
On the contrary; the notion of partnership has been developed to regulate the relation
between donors and recipients on the base of reciprocity. Patrick Holden (2005)
defines partnership as 'a co-operative relationship based on the principles of
mutuality and equality'. According to this definition, foreign aid transactions from
donors to recipients depend on mutual credibility, support and consensus on decision
making and accountability.
Internationally, BWIs and donors' agencies have published several working papers,
documents and declarations that reflect this shift in aid architecture from
conditionality to partnership. Furthermore; they have been developing criteria and
procedures to ensure partnership in aid allocation.
In 1996, the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which represents
major donors, published a remarkable report entitled "Shaping the 21st Century: The
Contribution of Development Co-operation". Donors affirmed through that
“Sustainable development, based on integrated strategies that incorporate key
economic, social, environmental and political elements, must be locally owned. The
role of external partners is to help strengthen capacities in developing partner
countries" (p.13). Accordingly; donors' agencies claimed that aid inflow would direct
not only to achieve economic growth but also to finance social policies. Indeed; the
report pointed that paternalistic approaches would be omitted because recipients'
countries would determine their development strategies. Additionally; the report
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affirmed that donors would support private sector and civil society beside government
as all are partners in development. Furthermore; DAC members suggested indicators
to ensure the commitment of developing countries.
Subsequently, donors declared their perspective about the new aid architecture; the
World Bank constructed the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) in 1999
which promotes the principles of ownership, cooperation among development
stakeholders and transparency on development outcomes with adopting holistic long
term strategy to eradicate poverty and achieve development (World Bank website,
n.d.)
In 2002, the international conference on financing development was held in
Monterrey city in Mexico to discuss the challenges of financing development. States
and governments reached a consensus "Monterrey Consensus" with regard to the
mechanisms of mobilization of both domestic and international resources for
development as well as the strategies to enhance monetary and trading system. The
Monterrey Consensus is considered one of the remarkable international agreement
advocating for partnership. Regarding international financial and technical
cooperation, it is stated that 'Effective partnerships among donors and recipients are
based on the recognition of national leadership and ownership of development plans
and, within that framework, sound policies and good governance at all levels are
necessary to ensure ODA [Official Development Assistance] effectiveness.' (United
Nations, 2003,p.14.)

With applying partnership; BWIs created in 1999 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
(PRSP) as a new approach through it aid will be channeled. The PRSP should be:
country – driven, result – oriented, comprehensive, partnership – oriented, and long 27

term strategy. And PRSPs became the reference for negotiations between donors'
agencies and recipients' countries (IMF, 2012.). Further the principle of partnership
was embedded in the MDGs. The 8th goal tackling global partnership in a broaden
manner as it includes different aspects of partnership between the ‘rich’ countries and
the ‘poor’ countries. These aspects are ODA disbarments, debt relief, free trade
regulations and new technology transformation. Though this goal aims to increase the
opportunity of the poor countries to integrate in the international economic system, it
does not reshape the relation between the poor countries and BWIs; furthermore, it
tackles these aspects in a separate way for instance it does not link between endorsing
free trade regulations and the effectiveness of technology transfer. On the other side,
it does not differentiate between the needs of the poor countries and small and locked
countries. Regarding ODA disbursements, it focuses on ODA volume and abandons
the regulations to manage this volume.

1.2. International Declarations

Following these series of international conferences, donors became more focused on
how to operationalize the agreed principles; therefore, specific international
statements that endorse aid effectiveness per se have been declared.

1.2.1. Rome Declaration on Harmonization

In February 2003, Rome Declaration on Harmonization was signed by 28 recipient
countries and 40 bilateral and multilateral donors. The declaration asserts that in order
to attain MDGs with stimulating economic growth in developing countries, donors
have to coordinate their disbursements and aid delivery process has to be based on
country level as development projects and programs are designed according to
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recipient's needs and priorities. Accordingly, donors have to underpin recipients'
capabilities in drawing and implementing development policies. To obtain these
objectives, the declaration set commitments on donor and recipient countries (OECD,
2003.)

What is more eminent in Rome Declaration is the principle of harmonization which is
articulated in this international statement while other declarations on aid effectiveness
tackle harmonization within other principles as will be explained later.

The declaration illustrates the reasons behind the need of aid coordination. From
donor's side, the high transaction costs represented in the number of missions and the
number of collected reviews and reports in addition to the contradiction among
adopting project cycles. From recipient's side, poor financial and administrative
capabilities and the contradiction of procedures required from each donor agency
(OECD, 2003.)

Donor countries that signed the declaration committed to synchronize their policies
and procedures through promoting delegated cooperation on country level, creating
incentives for staff in the field to work in harmonized way, affording technical
assistance upon recipient's demands and directing aid to sector or budget rather than
projects (OECD, 2003.)

The commitment on recipient countries is to reform their financial and administrative
systems to fit with donors' systems because donors apply 'international standards'. Six
African countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, Niger, Senegal and Zambia) are
selected to be the first countries adopt this commitment (OECD, 2003.)
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According to the commitments of Rome Deceleration, it is appeared that donors
determined indecisively the degree of harmonization; it is stated in the declaration 'we
will explore how such collaboration could help to ensure that new or revised policies
are appropriately harmonised or “harmonisable” with those of the partner countries
and donor institutions' (OECD, 2003, p.1). Further, the Declaration affirms that the
next step toward aid harmonization should be taken by the recipient countries as the
argument is that the recipient country has to lead donors to harmonize their
implemented activities.

1.2.2 Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness

In 2005, a significant step was taken and it reflected obviously the shift in the aid
architecture from conditionality to partnership; it was "Paris Declaration on Aid
Effectiveness" which became a procedural framework to apply partnership notion
between donors and recipients (OECD, 2005). The declaration set five "Partnership
Commitments":
1- Ownership:

Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their

development policies, and strategies and co-ordinate development actions
2- Alignment: Donors base their overall support on partner countries’ national
development strategies, institutions and procedures
3- Harmonization: Donors’ actions are more harmonized, transparent and
collectively effective
4- Managing for Result: Managing resources and improving decision-making for
results
5- Mutual accountability: Donors and partners are accountable for development
results.
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The declaration indicates to the challenges of aid effectiveness that include poor
administrative capabilities of recipient governments and high rates of corruption; poor
quality of national development policies; lack of predictability of aid disbursements;
absence of organizational incentives for bureaucrats in recipient countries and in
donor agencies and duplication and less coordination between specialized aid
programs such as HIV/AID programs which are adopted by various donors (OECD,
2005.)
The Paris Declaration is a progressive international statement compared to Rome
Declaration because it shares the causes of aid ineffectiveness and the responsibilities
between donors and recipients and that apparently employs in the last commitment
'mutual accountability' as both donors and recipient countries are responsible for the
results of applied development policies. Further, the sub commitments were
categorized under donor commitments; partner countries 'recipient' commitments and
joint commitments.
Importantly, the declaration sets twelve indicators to measure the progress in each
commitment and the year of 2010 is determined to be the target line to meet the five
commitments.

The Working Party on Aid Effectiveness [WP-EFF] was founded under the OECD. It
includes OECD/DAC members, partner countries and multilateral institutions. The
main goal of the Working Party is to monitor the performance of donor and recipient
countries in achieving the commitments of aid effectiveness (OECD website, n.d.)

Regarding the third principle 'harmonization', the declaration identifies five
dimensions of harmonization and under each dimension the commitments of donors
and recipients are determined (OECD, 2005), they are:
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1- Common arrangements and simplified procedures; donors are committed to
adopt joint financial and project cycles and to review their reporting systems
to simplify them. Further, donors have to discuss how to employ joint mission
in the field and to share information and practices among each others.
2- Complementarily and more effective division of labor; in this dimension
donors are committed to synchronize their producers; additionally, they are
advised to delegate their financial and administrative leadership to the donor
that has 'a comparative advantage' in the implemented program or project.
Whilst the recipient country has to prepare a map of the capabilities of each
donor and the best sector or program the donor is able to assist.
3- Incentives for collaborative behavior; bureaucrats in recipient countries and in
donor agencies have to get specialized trainings and to be stimulated to
underpin harmonized activities in their field functions.
4- Delivering effective aid in fragile states; in the case of fragile states where
government institutions and state capacity to deliver public services are weak,
harmonization among donor agencies are crucial to ease the complexity of
financial and administrative burden on the fragile government. Therefore,
donors are advised to use joint strategies and joint offices; on the other side,
they are encouraged to modify the aid modalities according to the government
conditions. While the fragile state has to reform its institutions and to develop
national development strategy reflects its needs and priorities with promoting
societal participation. Based on the pursuit of the fragile state in building the
institutions and formulating the national development strategy, donors will be
committed to the development priorities and will afford consultation on
development planning.
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5- Promoting a harmonised approach to the environmental assessments; donors
and recipient countries are committed jointly to share techniques and
information of environmental impact assessment (EIA). According to the
progress achieved in the environment field, harmonization will be extended to
other cross cutting aspects such as gender equality.
Among the twelve indicators, two indicators are set to measure the performance of
donors not recipient countries toward harmonization, these indicators are:
1- Use of common arrangements or procedures: donor has to allocate 66% of its
aid flows to programs not projects by 2010.
2- Encourage shared analysis: donors have to arrange 40% of its mission to be
joint missions and 66% of reviews and documents about the conditions of the
recipient country have to be prepared jointly.
Indeed, the principle of harmonization is embedded in the other four principles; in the
first principle ownership, the recipient country is supposed to take the lead of
coordination among national actors in preparing the development strategy and among
donors. In the principle of alignment, donors are advised to coordinate the style of aid
allocation if the recipient procurement system is inadequate. Regarding the principle
of managing for results, donors are supposed to harmonize their monitoring and
evaluation systems while in the mutual accountability, donors have to share
information on their aid flows (OECD, 2005.)
It is appeared that the scope of harmonization as tackled in Paris declaration has been
broadened to include cases of fragile states and specific development themes such as
environment. Though the declaration determines a set of indicators to guarantee the
commitments of donor and recipient countries, the language of indicators are flexible
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for example; in the dimension of delegation, the commitment is stated with using the
phrase of 'where appropriate'; further, the same language is used in defining the
methodology of measuring the indicators, it indicates that 'In measuring individual
donor performance, the indicators should be applied with flexibility in the recognition
that donors have different institutional mandates.' (OECD, 2005, P.13.)
Two monitoring surveys were conducted in 2006 and 2008 to assess the performance
of donors and recipient countries toward the 12 indicators stated in Paris declaration.
The surveys shows that notable progress has achieved in the aspects of using of untied
aid though tied aid concentrates in technical and food aid and increasing the allocation
of disbursements to the national budget and that action has been noted in the health
sector. Nonetheless, conditionality has not been diminished. On the other side, some
recipient countries have retained its ownership for development planning and
implementation and have pushed donor agencies to be aligned toward national
development needs and priorities (OECD 2006; 2008a.)
The performance regarding the two indicators on harmonization shows that donors'
commitment to use program - based approaches in delivering aid is modest as 46% of
aid inflows has allocated to programs in 2007 while the target is 66% by 2010. In the
second indicator, the survey finds that only 20% of missions are joint missions while
the target is 40% by 2010 and 43% of joint reviews and documents have been
prepared and the target is 66% (OECD, 2008a.)
According to the quite progress toward the commitments of harmonization, the
surveys identify the challenges that have encumbered the progress. From donor
perspectives, the challenges are: the poor capability (time and resources) of staff in
the field mission to promote harmonized activities with other missions and the need to
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conceive the achievements of aid agency to the public opinion and political actors.
While some recipient countries have not employed the principle of ownership and
they have designed development plans without considering the comparative
advantage of each donor (OECD, 2008a.)
Regardless of the findings of the monitoring surveys, some requirements became
visible through implementations. These requirements include the role of political
leadership in both donor and recipient countries to convince citizens, the government
bureaucrats; parliamentarians and civil society with the essence of partnership and the
utilities of adopting Paris principles (OECD, 2008a.)
1.2.3 Accra Agenda
To overcome the impediments that emerged after Paris Declaration, donor and
recipient countries held the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in
September 2008 in Accra, Ghana to reaffirm on the commitments of Paris Declaration
that have been vigorously challenged by severe global economic crises essentially the
boom of food and fuel prices and the climate change and the impacts of such global
crises on attaining MDGs. The meeting resulted in Accra Agenda on Aid
Effectiveness. The agenda describes the progress toward Paris commitments 'too slow'
progress; therefore, it revisits the key principles; ownership and partnership and
explores how to conceive development achievements without abandoning aid
effectiveness' commitments (OECD, 2008b.)
Concerning the principle of country ownership; the Accra Agenda illustrates how the
recipient country could develop its national strategy with the inclusion of all national
stakeholders such as parliamentarians, local governments, private sector, civil society
and media in formulating the national development strategy. The agenda indicates in
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this respect that if the capabilities of the recipient government impede to establish
such national dialogue, the government has to determine accurately the areas of
weakness in its institutions and accordingly donors are supposed to afford technical
assistances to improve the performance of institutions. On the other side; donors are
committed to use country system in managing aid disbursements. The Agenda also
illustrates that if the donor country has used its financial system or created parallel
institutions to avoid weak institutions; in that case the donor has to justify this
behavior and to assist recipient country to reform its institutions and regulation as
well (OECD, 2008b.)
In revisiting the principle of partnership, ‘Inclusive partnership’ is used for the first
time. It means that new comers to aid architecture mainly developing countries,
private enterprises and civil society organizations have to be committed to this
principles that constitutes the essence of aid effectiveness. Indeed, the agenda refers
apparently to the benefits of South - South cooperation and the crucial role of
multilateral organizations (OECD, 2008b.)
Moreover, the Agenda advises to reduce the duplication and to utilize the existing
organizations rather than establishing new ones. In this regard the agenda indicates to
the progress in using untied aid and it promotes recipient countries to use products
manufactured by national or regional enterprises in implemented projects (OECD,
2008b.)
The Agenda discusses the feasibility of development projects; it explains that to
persuade citizens in recipient countries and taxpayers in donor countries with the
impact of development aid, transparency and regular reviews have to be embedded in
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the process of implementing development projects. In this regard, mutual assessment
is important to reach feasible deliverables (OECD, 2008b.)
Harmonization has no specific room in Accra agenda though the monitoring surveys
show poor progress in the indicators of harmonization. However, the Agenda
reaffirms on allocating aid disbursements to programs and determines the role of
recipient countries and donors to apply the division of labor; the recipient country has
to introduce the role of each donor based on national priorities and the donor on the
other side has to disseminate its comparative advantages and best practices to
facilitate division of labor. Accordingly, Accra agenda has not added evident
dimension on the principle of harmonization.
1.2.4 The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation
With reaching the target year 2010, a monitoring survey was conducted with
participation of large number of recipient and donor countries compared to previous
surveys. The survey shows that the performance of recipient countries in general have
been better than donors and the coordination among donors in technical aid to
improve the capability of recipient government has been provided according to supply
driven approach. While quite progress has been achieved in using country financial
and administrative systems indeed the government to government aid has not been the
mainstream of aid modality (OECD, 2011a.)
Regarding harmonization, using common procedures and documents has not been the
mainstream; further, sharing the budget planning with the recipient countries has not
been consolidated. As a result aid is still fragment and less predictable (OECD,
2011a.)
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The Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness was held in 2011 in Busan in
South Korea to reassess the performance of donors and recipients countries. This
forum introduces a substantial change in the aid architecture on three aspects. The
first aspect is the shift from aid effectiveness to development effectiveness; the second
aspect is the expansion of the notion of partnership on the international and national
levels and the third aspect is the formulation of a structure to monitor the performance
of actors.
Regarding the first aspect, the transformation from aid effectiveness to development
effectiveness is driven by the need to attain the MDGs in 2015 in addition to foster the
economic growth of poor countries to sustain development. For that reason, job
creation, women rights, environment and other development themes are embedded in
the forum's discourse and the development policy coherence became a significant
term. In this respect, official development aid has been tackled as one resource that
complements other development resources such as investment and trade (BUSAN
Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, 2011). Through this change, the
global debate has returned back to square one to the Monterrey consensus in 2000
when development aid was discussed within other resources.
The second change is related to the notion of partnership; the new scope of
partnership is defined as ' the Partnership would adopt a multi-track approach, where
on the one hand, commitments agreed in Paris and Accra would continue to be
implemented and relevant parties would be held accountable for implementing the
unfinished aid effectiveness agenda, and on the other hand, the broad Partnership
would jointly implement commitments agreed in Busan' (WP-EFF, 2011, p. 6.). In
addition to the commitment to attain partnership facets as identified in the indicators
38

of Paris declaration, the notion practically is broaden to include new donors besides
the traditional donors represented in DAC committee. Those donors are developing
countries that have achieved notable development through adopting their development
prescript and China, India, Brazil are the main new donors. Furthermore, the new
global partnership claims the role of South – South cooperation in encountering
economic growth and development. Apparently, the new orientation of partnership is
built on 'triangulation cooperation' as various resources of funding are welcomed to
participate in the new aid architecture (BUSAN Partnership for Effective
Development Cooperation, 2011.)
On national level, 'country level' instead of ' government' became the core unit in
handling the principle of ownership. Societal participation and private sectors have to
be rigorously integrated in formulating and implementing the national development
strategies. In view of that, the development priorities and other action plans about the
role of donors that prepared by the recipient government have to be discussed first
with all economic and social actors so that the implementation of national
development strategies could be easier because of the consensus on them (BUSAN
Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, 2011.).
The third change is about the structure of the 'Global Partnership for Effective
Development Cooperation (GPEDC)'. This change could be considered a progressive
step because the commitments of Paris Declaration are monitored in casual way by
the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness under the OECD. The Working Party's main
task is to conduct surveys to evaluate the performance and not all donor and recipient
countries have participated in those surveys. Therefore creating well identified
structure is a step forward to pledge the agreed principles. The main functions of the
new structure are: 1) endorsing political commitment to effective development
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cooperation; 2) regulating the monitoring and evaluation processes; 3) sharing
knowledge and information among actors and 4) underpinning the commitment of
national stakeholders to Busan principles (WP- EFF, 2012a.)
Though the new structure has not been set yet, ten donor and recipient countries and
organizations were assigned to propose the scope and functions of the new structure,
African countries have been represented in this group by Rwanda and the South
African besides the African Union. The proposed structure consists of three bodies:
the Council will represent the ministers of countries that adopted Busan Outcome
Document and the civil society organizations will be able to participate in the
council's meetings. The council will provide the political promise to the global
partnership and it will discuss the raising issues on development cooperation. The
second body is the Steering Committee that aims to spread the policies and needs of
partnership in the international fora such as G20, UN and Rio+20 and to ensure the
implementation of agreed principles on the country level. Various forms of
membership are proposed; the narrow formulation will include representatives of
traditional donors; new donors and recipient countries while the broad formulation
will make the membership open for donor and recipient countries in addition to
representatives from private sectors; parliamentarians and civil society organizations.
The Secretariat will be formed form OECD/DAC and UNDP due to their experiences
in collecting, disseminating data on the performance and the best practices of
development partners (Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation,
2012.)
One of proposed ideas regarding the structure of the new global Partnership is Block
that will work as a pressure group. It includes various actors who are interested in a
certain issue in development cooperation. During meetings, different blocks were
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formed such as a block on the fragile state, block on South - South cooperation and a
block on public private cooperation. There is a consensus in Bsuan on not to
institutionalize the emerging blocks so that they could handle their issues easier (WPEFF, 2012b.)
Concerning the principle of harmonization, it has not had a distinct dimension in
Busan forum; however, there has been a conformation on the magnitude of sharing
updated and comprehensive information about the type of funds. Furthermore, donors
are committed to disseminate their expected aid disbursements for 3 or 5 years in
advance so that recipient countries or organizations can plan their budget efficiently;
additionally, donors are committed to increase their joint missions; delegate their
financial or administrative authorities to the appropriate donor and to decrease the
number of parallel units and to use the global units to manage their disbursements
(BUSAN Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, 201.)
UNDP, EU, Overseas Development Institute, Germany, Uganda and Honduras
formed 'Busan Building Block on Managing Diversity and Reducing Fragmentation'.
They aim to enhance harmonization through limiting fragmentation and proliferation
and to assist recipient countries to open other channels of development funds. The
members in the block agreed that there are different approaches and tools to reduce
fragmentation and to ensure ownership such as joint programming, division of labor,
and delegated cooperation. On the other side, they advised that recipient countries
have to develop their systems in collecting data to be more accurate in order to help
donor countries in planning their harmonized actions. Furthermore, they claimed that
the recipient country has the right to choose its donors (The Fourth High-Level Forum
on Aid Effectiveness, 2011).
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This part discusses the principle of harmonization as tackled in the international level.
It shows how this principle has been the core of the first international declaration on
aid effectiveness Rome Declaration and then in Paris declaration the indicators were
developed to assess the performance of donors. While the Accra agenda and The New
Global Partnership that will replace Paris Declaration have not emphasized on the
principle and indicates to its dimensions when discussing the notions of ownership
and partnership.

What more important in Paris Declaration is the scope of

harmonization was broaden to include financial, bureaucratic and policy
harmonization.
1.3. Regional Policies on Aid Harmonization
This part will discuss the views of the regional organizations on aid effectiveness and
the principle of harmonization in particular. It will differentiate between the
perspective of donor organization represented in the EU, where the U.K and Denmark
have its membership, and the AU's perspective that represents Ghana and Tanzania.
1.3.1. The EU Policies
The EU endorsed in the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 the scope of development
cooperation. It is built on three main principles: Coordination, Complementarity and
Coherence (3Cs). Coordination indicates to the cooperation among member states to
avoid high transaction costs; while the principle of complementarity aims to limit
duplication among European community and member states in allocating
development aid and coherence aims to employ consistency of implemented activities
in the field or in the adopted policy (Paul Hoebink, 2004.)
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In 2006 a leading declaration "The European Consensus on Development" is adopted.
This declaration is considered the European manifesto on aid effectiveness. The
Development cooperation in the Consensus is defined as 'a shared competence
between the European Community and the Member States. Community policy in
the sphere of development cooperation shall be complementary to the policies
pursued by the Member States' (European Parliament, Council and Commission,
2006, p. 1). Based on this definition of development cooperation, it is a narrow
definition as it limits cooperation between the European community that includes the
Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament and the member
states. Then according to the comparative advantage of each member state and the
European community, EU manages its aid disbursements to the outside developing
countries.
The consensus identified four sets of principles that guide the allocation of European
aid. The first group of principles is about endorsing ownership and partnership in
addition to alignment to national development strategies. Despite the alignment to
national priorities, the European community and member states are committed to
underpin the role of civil society organizations in formulating and implementing
national development policies; additionally, there is an emphasis on women
participation in national policies. Politically, the European Community is committed
to intervene in the fragile states and to assist them in building the capacity of weak
governments. Indeed, the consensus anchors the importance of political dialogue
among member states and the community in order to share their perspectives and
practices on development issues such as human rights and illegal migration.
(European Parliament, Council and Commission, 2006.)
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The second set of principles 'Delivering more and better aid' reaffirms the
commitment to increase the aid flows of member states to constitute 0.7% of GNI by
2015. Meeting this commitment is coincided with the performance of recipient
countries and the degree of transparency in managing the received aid. Harmonization
has been underpinned in this set of principle as it claims the commitment to the
international principles on aid effectiveness. According to the consensus, different
aid modalities (project aid; sector or general budget support and humanitarian aid) are
complementary; however, it indicates that the better practice is sector or general
budget support. Concerning the managing of aid predictability and decreasing untied
aid, European members and community are guided by OECD recommendations.
Furthermore, the European community is committed to encourage its members to
allocate their aid via joint multiannual programming and joint missions and to share
the analysis documents. What is important, the European community is committed to
direct 50% of its aid to the recipient government using its financial and administrative
systems and to decrease the uncoordinated missions by 50%. Finally the consensus
affirms that the recipient country genuinely has to lead donor coordination (European
Parliament, Council and Commission, 2006.)
The third set of principles 'Policy Coherence for development (PCD)' focuses on the
importance of complementing among development trends and resources. European
community and members have to coordinate their trade, investment, migration and
agriculture policies (European Parliament, Council and Commission, 2006.)
The last set of principles is about facing global challenges that reflect in severe
dimensions of poverty. The consensus advocates concentrating aid disbursements in
areas of poverty without abandoning the principles of ownership and alignment
(European Parliament, Council and Commission, 2006.)
44

To operationalize the 3Cs and the Development Consensus, EU endorsed in 2007 the
Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labor in Development Policy.
This code sets guidelines for member states to ensure aid effectiveness in terms of
principles of Paris Declaration (Council of the European Union, 2007). It includes:
-

Concentrate on a limited number of sectors in-country to reduce
transaction costs and channel aid to budget support.

-

Redeployment for other in-country activities.

-

Lead donor arrangement.

-

Delegated cooperation.

-

Ensure an adequate donor support.

-

Replicate practices at regional level.

-

Establish priority countries.

-

Analyze and expand areas of strength.

-

Pursue progress on other dimensions of complementarity

Apparently, this code includes various aspects that limited aid fragmentation by
applying delegation and lead donor mechanism; recipient selectivity and sector and
budget support.
Furthermore; the EU recommends providing aid by preparing multiannual
programming that responds better to recipients' development priorities and attains
complementary policies. In addition, it adopted the Joint Assistance Strategies and
EU-dialogue as mechanisms to coordinate areas of activity and avoiding duplication
(Council of the European Union, 2007). In 2010, the EU adopted action plan that
focuses more on the aspects of aid coordination; it determines five priorities to
enhance effectiveness: use of country systems including capacity building, division of
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labor, untied aid, changed conditionality and predictability and transparency (The 3Cs
initiative website.)
The EU has mainly articulated the principle of harmonization within the goal of
development coordination not under the goal of aid effectiveness then it has
developed various guides and tools to employ this principle in the field.
1.3.2. The African policies
Since the beginning of the third millennium, African countries represented in the AU
and NEPAD have tackled aid effectiveness through a series of joint meetings with
donor countries and organizations. In 2003, the African Partnership Forum was
founded with the aim of promoting dialogue between NEPAD and G8. The forum
holds two meetings in year; the first meeting in the spring headed by a country of G8
to discuss polices and priorities of African countries; the second meeting in the
autumn headed by an African country and to monitor and evaluate the
implementations (African Partnership Forum website). In 2010, The Tunis Consensus
was declared to represent the African view toward aid effectiveness, African countries
and institutions advocate for development effectiveness rather than focusing on aid.
This view is driven by the attainment of independence. Therefore, the consensus
invokes the pivotal role of state in development and magnetizing the alternative
resources to finance development. The consensus determined six areas to endorse
development effectiveness, they are stated as following:
1- Building a capable state to be able to implement development strategies.
2- Developing democratic accountability to share responsibilities between the
government and development stakeholders.
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3- Promoting South-South cooperation to create alternative resources for
development and growth and to foster continental integration.
4- Thinking and acting regionally to allocate development aid to transboundary
projects to accelerate regional integration.
5- Embracing new development partners to benefit from development
experiences of the other developing countries such as India, Brazil and China
and this potential cooperation will built on transparency and mutual benefits.
6- Outgrowing aid dependence to increase local resources through reform tax
systems and search for alternatives to finance development plans.
According to the Tunis Consensus, African countries reiterate aid independency
through improving state capacity so that it can mobilize other revenues internally and
externally to implement the development plans. Additionally, African countries
sought to underpin the regional integration and the South - South cooperation; in this
regard, the consensus criticizes Paris Declaration because it focuses on the
effectiveness of bilateral aid and omits aid disbursements to regional investments and
projects. As well, the consensus criticizes the degree of commitment of donor
agencies to employ country financial and administrative systems as donor agencies
put conditions to use national system and ask recipient country to apply international
standards and to abandon the national dynamics. (The Tunis Consensus, 2010.)
Following up the consensus, in 2010, NEPAD and African Union established the
'Africa Platform for Development Effectiveness (APDev)' with partnership of UNDP,
WB, GIZ, AfDB, and The Institute for Security of Studies (ISS). It is a website for
sharing information, learned lessons and best practices in the fields of designing
development policies and employing principles of ownership and regional integration
(African Partnership Forum website.)
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Concerning the new global partnership, African countries with other recipient
countries stated a position paper representing Partner Countries’ visions and
priorities for discussion at the High Level Forum 4 (HLF4) in Busan before
holding the summit in 2011. The position paper elaborates the impediments of
development effectiveness and their views on the new architecture (OECD, 2011a.)
In the meeting of the 'Africa Platform for Development effectiveness' that was held
after Busan in 2012 in Addis Ababa, African countries asserts on the alignment of
donor countries to national priorities; combating the illegal disbursements to Africa in
addition to meet the international commitment of increasing aid to 0.7% of GNI
(APDev, 2012). Regarding the establishment of new architecture based on
development effectiveness, they affirm on the need to integrate Africa in the global
arrangements such as G20 and in the executive level in the governmental institutions
WB and UN in particular (African Union and NEPAD, 2011.)
The perspective of African countries on the notion of partnership, they affirm on the
'transformative partnership' where the South - South cooperation and private sector
participation complement the traditional pattern of cooperation between the north and
the south. Furthermore, they assert that the new partnership has to complement the
African vision not to create new strategy. The African vision is built on decreasing aid
dependency and supporting capacity building in order to mobilize domestic resources.
Indeed, they retain the new architecture has to be guided by national demands and
needs and to consider coherence among development policies (African Union and
NEPAD, 2011.)
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After the 18th summit of African Union in 2012; they established two arrangements in
order to deploy Africa's needs and priorities in the new architecture: the Ministerial
Working Group to drive Africa’s interests in the post- Busan process and the Africa
Post-Busan Technical Working Group (African Partnership Forum website.)
It is appeared that the focal point of African perception is development effectiveness
which is compatible with the new architecture. Aid effectiveness has been handled
within the broad vision on development cooperation. More important, aid
harmonization has not been addressed as a step to overreach aid independency.
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CHAPTER II
DONORS’ AID POLICIES
This chapter will illustrate U.K and Denmark policies toward Africa since the new
millennium when attaining economic and social development became an essential
factor in determining the goals of foreign policies. The chapter will examine the
foreign policy toward the African continent then aid policies through exploring the
white papers and arrangements that manage development aid disbursements to verify
to what extent both U.K and Denmark endorse aid harmonization.
2.1 The United Kingdom
2.1.1 Foreign policy toward Africa
The British foreign policy toward Africa in the new millennium has been dominated
by the Labour Party that formed the government in 1997, after 17 years in the seat of
opposition, and it handed the power to the Conservative Party in 2010.
The Third Way ideology formulated the Labour Party's policies that compiles
between economic liberal policies and social justice principles. This ideology has
been translated into foreign policy goals. Paul Kelemen (2007) explained historically
the Labour Party's policy toward Africa which had been covered by social principles.
The Labour Party underlined the role of African peasants in the development of local
communities with countering the role of capitalist merchants in the West Africa in
particular. Notwithstanding, the Party promoted the movement of modernization in
Africa through expanding the British enterprises and privatization the plantations in
African so peasants became paid labor in African lands. The Party's policies in
modernizing Africa through capitalist policies were elaborated by two reasons; to
impede African migration to Britain through creating opportunities for African labors
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and to increase the productivity of lands by local development. In spite of these
economic liberal policies, the Labour Party played the role of the defender of African
labor rights as it worked to empower the cooperatives and trade unions because these
arrangements could balance between the applied capitalist policies and social
premises. After the Second World War, the policy of the Labour Party that was based
on ‘socialisation and self-government’ alongside 'development' participated in
acquiring independence later. For example, the Movement for Colonial Freedom
(MCF) that emerged in 1954 came out form the Labour Party and in 1956 the Party
suggested to hand over the power to the African territories where the white settlers
inhibited so they could assist Africans in building the state.
The adopted policy that combines liberal economy and socialist goals has identified
the Party's foreign policy with the 'morale foreign policy'. Rita Abrahmsen and Paul
Williams (2001) demonstrate how the ideology of the 'Third Way' has been reflected
in the British foreign policy toward Africa as peace, prosperity and democracy have
been declared the three imperatives that guide the British policy in Africa. Regarding
preventing conflicts and building the peace, the UK sent troops to Sierra Leon in 2000
in order to end the conflict. While to attain prosperity for African countries, U.K has
endorsed poverty reduction through enhancing economic growth via free and fair
trade; erasing debt and disbursing development aid. Promoting good governance is the
way to consolidate democracy.

The success of British intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000 alongside the prominent
role of development aid in reducing poverty comparing to other Western donors the
USA in particular have accelerated Africa in the British foreign policy domains.
Additionally, the public opposition to the participation in the war against Iraq in 2003
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has embarked Africa in Tony Blair's foreign policy to retain his achievements in the
field of foreign policy (Tom Porteous, 2005.)

Consequently, Africa became the focus of Blair's foreign policy in the second term
started in 2001. In 2004, Tony Blair invited the leaders of G8 to an international
summit on Africa. From this summit, the Commission on Africa Development was
formed and it disseminated the report entitled 'Our Common Interest'. The rationale of
the summit was to renew the international commitments to provide African countries
with technical and financial assistances to attain Africa progress. The summit
admitted that African countries have been struggled to reduce poverty and they need
'big Push' from donors. Accordingly, the summit proposed a 'comprehensive package
for Africa' that emphasizes on building the capacity of state to be capable of
delivering services; preventing internal violence and promoting security; and
attracting investments and various enterprises to prosper economic growth (Our
Common Interest, 2005.)
The summit concluded with a promise of increasing ODA to Africa by US$25 billion
per year for five years and additional US$25 billion a year to be implemented by
2015. The conditions of increasing aid are feasible impacts and good governance and
from donor side; harmonization, ownership, untied aid, predictability and
accountability have to be embedded in their aid policies (Our Common Interest,
2005.)
Apparently, the summit drew good image for Britain in the international arena as the
leader of development and the poor; Tony Blair stated ‘Eliminating world poverty is
in Britain’s interests – and is one of the greatest moral challenges we face.’(DIFD,
2006, P. 4.)
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Despite the role that Tony Blair tried to illustrate, different reasons affected
negatively on this role. The Military intervention in Africa, the U.K has been accused
of having illegal arm trade with Sierra Leon and DRC; indeed, its intervention in
Sierra Leon in 2000 was against the UN embargo and the number of British soldiers
in the UN peace troops in Africa is very small and outside the fieldwork.
(Abrahamsen and Williams, 2001). On the other side, the rationale of the African
commission has drawbacks; Paul D.Williams (2005) argues that the commission and
the released report advocates for neo liberal economic policies and that contradicts
with the ideology of the Labour Party. Despite that, the report has not got the support
from other G8 countries; for example, the USA and Japan argue that the
recommendations of the report could not be adopted because they are not appropriated
with their budget and financial modalities; while Germany and Italy claimed that they
have not been willing to send more disbursements to Africa. On the contrary, France
and Canada stated that their disbursements to Africa actually reached the proposed
amount and they covered the development fields. Furthermore, the commission has
tackled the G8 trade policies toward African countries; they have not promised to
decrease trade barriers on agriculture products in particular. In addition, the call for
debt relief is conditioned on adopting economic reforms. The U.K is sending its
assistances to Uganda, Zimbabwe and corrupted regimes which contradicts with the
principles of good governance. Williams added that the report has not tackled
explicitly the relation among terrorism; poverty and undemocratic regimes in some of
African countries.
Incidents have appeared the paradox in the Labour Party's policies toward Africa and
how such paradox between its ethical values for assisting poor countries and
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attainment the national interests has deteriorated its image in the international arena
(Abrahamsen and Williams, 2001; Chris Allen, 1998.)

On the contrary, the Conservative Party's polices toward Africa, which formed the
government in 2010, has determined its priorities explicitly, Henry Bellingham, the
Minister for Africa in Foreign and Commonwealth Office delivered a speech in
December 16, 2010 under the title of 'UK and Africa: Delivering Prosperity
Together'; where he identifies three areas of U.K missions in Africa:

1- Increasing the British enterprises and investments in Africa with focusing on
deepening trade relations with economic hubs in the continent such as South
Africa and Senegal. However, in this regard, the minister affirms that
promoting economic relations with African regimes does not mean omitting
human rights records and inequality; therefore, the cooperate social
responsibility (CSR) of British enterprises are supposed to assist in providing
social services to endorse growth with equity.
2- Flourishing trade relations among African countries through supporting
African Union and economic regional organizations.
3- Promoting African integration in the global economy. Therefore, Britain will
persuade European countries and G8 to open their markets for Africa's
products; on the other side, Britain will facilitate for African Diaspora to start
their business in U.K.

These declared objectives are compatible with general British objectives that focus on
building economic relations with the rising economies and on protecting economic
interests. More important, these objectives are coincided with the principles of the
Conservatives Party. Historically, the Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in the eve of
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colonies independence in 1960 delivered the speech 'Wind of the Change' in Cape
Town; he tried to convince the new independent states to join the west part through
the commonwealth where the state sovereignty is respected and military and
administrative support are available; additionally, he emphasized on economic
interdependence between the new independent states.

According to policies of the Labour Party and the Conservative Party, Africa has
economic priority in the British foreign policy. For the Conservative Party,
strengthening the economic relations is the clear target; while the Labour Party
covers this interest with political objectives such as promoting good governance and
protecting democracies.

2.1.2 The British Aid Policy
This part demonstrates the institutional attributes of British foreign aid and its
commitments to aid effectiveness including the principle of harmonization.
The Colonial Development Act (1929) determined the fields of the allocation of
technical assistances; machines for agriculture sector to increase the productivity of
farms and infrastructure projects mainly electricity, irrigation systems besides internal
transportation and building ports to transfer products to Britain.
By the end of the Second World War in 1945, the U.K declared the Colonial
Development and Welfare Act. According to this act, British assistances to the
colonies would channel to education sector besides promoting 'welfare' of colonies
(Kelemen, 2007). During the cold war, foreign aid was a crucial tool, in this regard,
the Labour Party in 1957 suggested establishing 'International Development
Authority' which the Western powers could channel their aid to Africa; moreover, the
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Party declared its intension to increase aid disbursements to 1% of national income.
The endeavor of these actions was to combat the influence of Soviet Union in the
continent and to decline imperialist exploitation under the capitalist enterprises
through channeling more aid (Kelemen, 2007.)
Regarding the institutions that manage aid policy, in conjunction with decolonization
period, the U.K founded the Department of Technical Cooperation in 1961 to provide
technical assistance to the newly independent states. Then in 1964, the government
managed British aid through the Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM). While in
the 1970s the management of foreign aid changed more than once. First the ODM
affiliated to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) with the name of 'Overseas
Development Administration (ODA)' then it separated from FCO to back as a
ministry. Finally in 1979 it returned to the FCO (DFID, 2011). This change could be
explained by the international economic crises occurred in the 1970s and the lack of
available resources.
After the Labour Party formed the government in 1997, the British development aid
has been managed by a separated institution, 'the Department for International
Development (DFID)' which is headed by a cabinet minister. The establishment of
DFID was combined with the reviews occurred by BWI, UN agencies and OECD on
the essence of development cooperation. On the other hand, being an independent
entity separated from the FCO has led to separate development efforts that focus on
poverty reduction from other national interests such as trade relations and investment
(Porteous, 2005.)
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In the light of the new architecture of international aid that coincided in the late of
1990s, the DFID's mission on drawing aid policies are determined in three main areas
(DFID, 1997):
1- Promoting sustainable economic growth with focusing on local economic
development in rural areas. In addition to protecting human rights including
women rights via preventing violence and conflicts.
2- Improving human development through providing the poor with primary
education and basic health care for infants and women as long as facilitating their
access to save water and food.
3- Reserving environment through effective use of renewable and non - renewable
resources.
Oliver Morrissey (2002) claims that establishing DFID has deployed the British aid
policy effectively. The amount of aid disbursements and the number of staff and
country offices have increased. More important, management by results and planning
long term strategies have been the adopted approaches in addition to the focus on
regular evaluation. Further, being as a separate governmental entity enables DFID to
negotiate and influence the other government bodies (OECD 2009.)
The Labour Party issued two international development acts. The first was in 2002;
this act determines the functions and sectors that the British development aid should
be allocated and the modalities of aid disbursements. Generally, the act identifies
poverty reduction as the target of ODA and concerning the forms of assistance, they
include grant, loan and guarantee; technical assistance, that transfers the knowhow,
scholarship and tied aid. The act clarifies that the treasury is responsible for setting
the conditions of giving loans to developing countries. As well, the relation with
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multilateral organizations and private sectors are arranged in this act (International
Development Act, 2002.)
The second act declared in 2006; emphasizes on the methods of monitoring and
evaluation of the British development aid. It illustrates how to allocate aid
disbursements effectively with targeting the international commitment of 0.7% of
GNI. Thus, it affirms on identifying the development objectives with the recipient
countries clearly and the budget cycle. Further, the act demonstrates the way of
submitting annual reports from the Secretary of International Development to the
parliament (International Development 'Reporting and Transparency' Act, 2006.)
The British governments prepared various white papers to identify the main principles
of aid allocation and to guide actions in the filed. The first white paper (Command
Paper 2736) prepared in 1965 after the most of colonies got their independences.
Poverty reduction was determined the overreaching objective of ODA. In the 1975
another command paper (6270) released has claimed that the rural development
would be the adopted approach to reduce poverty (DFID, 1997.)
Under the Labour Party government four white papers were published; the first one
was in 1997 when the Party seized the power, the second in 2000; the third was in
2006 and it was built on the outputs of the international summit on Africa in 2004 and
the final white paper was published in 2009.
The first white paper in 1997 is coincided with the global objective of the new
millennium to reduce the number of extreme poor to the half by 2015; however, the
rationale of reducing poverty is based on attaining economic growth via adopting neo
liberal policies. Further, the paper affirms on the role private sectors, civil society
organizations and research institutions in delivering development goals (DFID, 1997.)
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The second white paper that published in 2000 emphasizes on globalization as a
determinant of international development. The paper addressed that globalization
embeds impediments and opportunities to overreach the international goal.
Accordingly, the British development aid would target four aspects: building the
capacity of poor states so that they could adopt and implement pro poor economic
policies and fight corruption that deters development; improving human development
in terms of education and health in addition to technology; the third area is to employ
the private sector in financing development specially globalization promotes the role
of enterprises in the international system with decreasing trade barriers. The final area
is to protect environment to guarantee sustainable development (DFID, 2000.)
Regarding the amount of aid that would disburse to the targeted areas, the paper
argues that under globalization conditions available development assistances have
been directing to the middle income countries that have good economic performance
while the poor countries have been receiving little amount of ODA. Therefore the
government promised in this white paper to allocate 0.33% of GNP for development
aid in 2003/2004 budget and to direct 74% of this allocation to the poorest countries
including African countries (DFID, 2000.)
The third white paper was published after two years from the summit on Africa
Development. Thus it affirms on the recommendations of the summit mainly the
necessary of doubling the amount of ODA directed to African countries. In this
regard, the paper indicated that U.K under the government of Labour Party has
increased the amount of aid by 140% from 1997 till 2005 (DFID, 2006.)
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Despite the paper has tackled the same focus areas of aid allocation addressed in the
previous white papers; technical researches for improving human conditions and
fragile states are determined additional areas (DFID, 2006.)
The current white paper that guided British aid policy was published in 2009 after
Blair left the government. The successor Prime Minister Gordon Brown has used a
slight different discourse; besides affirming on the role of the U.K as the defender of
the poor in the international system; he declared that the attainment of national
security is a fundamental objective of aid disbursements. In the forward section of the
white paper, the Prime Minister Brown stated 'The United Kingdom will keep the
promises we have made. We will do so because it is morally right. But also because
our prosperity, security and health are increasingly inseparable from events far
beyond our borders' (DFID, 2009, P.5.)
This white paper, like the second one published in 2000, departed form the global
challenges facing the poor countries such as international economic fluctuations;
transboundary conflict and climate change. To combat these challenges, the British
aid will endorse economic growth in sustainable and environmental way and will
direct its ODA to the poorest countries, fragile states and vulnerable people. Above
that, the British ODA will be allocated in a collective way as the U.K will work with
the UN agencies to meet the MDGs and with G8 to improve the effectiveness of
ODA. It could be noticed that this paper tackles ways of aid effectiveness explicitly
(DFID, 2009.)
2.1.3 Harmonization policies
The aforementioned white papers have placed significant emphasis on the
international coordination in delivering ODA. The various dimensions of coordination
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including the relation with other donors; areas of focus and aid modality have been
conceived in the papers.
Concerning the coordination with other donors; it could be noticed that the U.K has
the real willing to increase the cooperation with multilateral organizations and other
donor countries. In the white paper of 1997, the paper indicates to the importance of
coordination with other donors without emphasis on the techniques of fostering this
sort of coordination. For example, it is stated 'We Shall Work closely with other
donors and development agencies to build partnerships with developing countries
to strengthen the commitment to the elimination of poverty…' (DFID, 1997, p. 6.)
The second paper published in 2000, shows the coordination with Germany, the
Netherlands, Norway, Denmark and Sweden in Tanzania and in Malawi for
promoting the sector wide approach.
However, after the Paris Declaration in 2005, the coordination with other donor
countries has increased. The third White paper in 2006 addressed that it has
harmonized the allocation of its disbursements with other donors in 20 recipient
countries; adopted joint strategies in 6 countries and joint office in two countries and
the South Sudan is one of both cases (DIFD, 2006). Moreover, it has shared technical
advisers with other donors; for instance, it got assistance from WB staff and it shared
economic adviser with Netherlands in Rwanda (OECD, 2010a). In a step forward to
harmonization, the U.K shared information of its implemented operations via DIFD
databases and joined the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) (DIFD,
2009). However, the white paper pointed to the drawback in the monitoring and
evaluation systems (DFID, 2006.)
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Although the U.K is trying to delegate its operations, it is addressed that 61% of
British staff allocated in the head offices while 39% of the staff in the field; further,
the staff who are in the field have lacked the capability and the authority to foster
coordination with other donor agencies in the same field (OECD, 2009.)
The rationale of enhancing the coordination with the multilateral organizations is
'Their [multilateral development institutions] political neutrality and technical
expertise enable them to take a leadership and coordination role on major problems
and global issues such as debt reduction, human

rights

and

refugees,

gender equality, the environment and the AIDS pandemic.' (DFID, 2006, P. 34.)
Further, it is addressed that when the U.K lacks the financial or technical capability in
delivering certain targets, it will direct its available assistance to the multilateral
organization that has the comparative advantages. Though the criterion is the
comparative advantage, it seems that the U.K prefers to allocate its ODA to the
multilateral organizations than to the appropriate donor country. Therefore in 1997,
the U.K declared that the half of its ODA actually directed to the multilateral
organizations including the UN agencies; WB and EU (DFID, 1997). And in the 2006
white paper, it claimed that 40% of aid disbarments would channel through
multilateral organizations.

To conceive the coordination with the multilateral

organizations, it encourages the UN to adopt one budget and one program
representing development objectives of the UN agencies so that it can reduce
duplication and fragmentations of UN programs; further, it recommends donor
countries to direct their disbursements to the UN agencies. In this respect, the U.K
promotes the coordination among the regional development banks (DFID, 2006.)
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The focus of the final white paper is on aid effectiveness thus it affirms on improving
the ability of multilateral organizations and regional development banks to respond
effectively to the development needs and priorities of the poor countries. Increasing
the representation of the poor countries in the executive bodies of these organizations
is crucial to attain responsiveness (DFID, 2009.)
Regarding the focus areas, the poverty reduction is the main target and according to
this goal the U.K allocates its disbursements. Moreover, the cooperation with other
bilateral and multilateral donors is condition on their commitment to implement
poverty reduction strategies (DIFD, 1997; 2000; 2006); for instance, the budget of
2007/2008, the U.K allocated 44% of the total aid to MDGs operation (OECD,
2010a.)
However, the Conservative Party since 2010 emphasizes on gender, wealth creation,
climate change and fragile state (OECD, 2010b.)
The U.K adopted selectivity in geographic areas and operations; for the geography, it
believes that ODA should target to the poorest countries that most of them in Africa
thus African countries and African organizations such as the African Development
Bank are the main destination of British aid. Within the poorest countries, it attain to
direct aid disbursements to countries that prove political will to adopt reform and
reduce poverty therefore it decreased its operations to a third since 1997 and currently
the DFID offices are serving in 23 countries (DFID, 2009).
Regarding aid modality; in spite of claiming that the sector- wide approach is better
modality of aid allocation to maintain the principle of ownership. other forms have
been addressed in the white papers such as capital aid that channeled to specific
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projects or activities; program aid to support the balance of payments and budget
and technical aid such as training and scholarships.
Channeling aid to the government budget requires that the recipient country to adopt
financial reforms and to develop the accountability system; therefore the U.K is
committed to allocate just 5% of the disbarments to the national budget while the
recipient country implements the reforms (OECD, 2010b.)
In the regard of aid predictability, the U.K claimed to use the Medium-term
predictability as it will share its aid budget plan for three years in advance and there is
intention to use ten-year Development Partnership Arrangements (DPAs) (OECD,
2010b.)

2.2 Denmark
2.2.1 Foreign policy toward Africa
The location of Denmark as a small state between strong western European countries
and the Scandinavian countries in the north of Europe determines its foreign policy.
Since the end of the Second World War, Denmark's foreign policy is between two
different purposes; the first is to attain the direct national interests in security and
economic prosperity while the second is to deploy the Nordic identity (Ben Tonra,
2001.)
To attain the national interests; the Western powers represented in NATO and EU are
the fundamental arrangements to protect the national interests. Concerning security
and defense issues, Denmark joined the NATO early as the alliance with the USA
guarantees the purposed security. Accordingly, Denmark has involved in the NATO
64

operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan and in Iraq. The relation with NATO has the
highest priority in the Danish foreign policy (Tonra, 2001.)
For enhancing its economic growth, the European Union is an essential partner
though it did not join the European Coal and Steal Community in the beginning
because the steel and cool were not important products for its economy; further, the
main trade partners including the U.K did not involve in the first EU arrangement.
When Denmark applied for joining the EU in 1961, it took this action based on the
U.K that applied as well for the EU membership and although their applications were
rejected due to political rivalry with France, they applied again in the 1970 and joined
the EU (Tonra, 2001.)
Since being EU member, the relation with the EU has the highest priority in Danish
foreign policy and it has been working to deepen its role within the union. For
example, it encouraged the EU enlargement in 2004 because it is considered an
opportunity for Danish exports. However, to maintain its position among the 25
member states, Denmark urges for the bilateral connections among members in
discussing and designing policies (Per Carlsen and Hans Mouritzen, 2004.)
To retain its Nordic identity, Denmark has worked to convince this aim through
institutionalization its relation with Nordic countries. In 1952, it initiated the Nordic
Council to be a collective arrangement discussing the security and defiance issues.
Later in 1962, the Nordic Cooperation Agreement was founded then it followed by an
initiation to establishing a regional custom Union (NORDEK). These Nordic
arrangements had not been successful to develop common Nordic objectives in
security and foreign policy issues due to the conflict of interests among Nordic
countries and the nature of relation with the EU; in this regard, Denmark was blamed

65

that it emphasized on its relation with western European countries (Tonra, 2001).
Evidently, promoting the Nordic identity has not been a priority for Denmark with the
security and economic challenges it has been facing. For example, in 2009 a report
was prepared to show how Nordic countries could endorse collective security, the
report concluded that the difference of political strategies and interests have precluded
any attempt to develop a collective security; above that, the Nordic countries involve
in NATO prefer to manage their defense issues through NATO (Clive Archer, 2010).
Further, with the global economic crisis in 2008, the Nordic cooperation became on
the agenda as a tool to combat this crisis; however, Denmark has tackled this possible
solution with doubts (Nanna Hvidt and Hans Mouritzen, 2010.)
Apparently, Denmark has designed its foreign policy objectives based on its national
interests which are compatible with NATO and EU whilst the cooperation with the
Nordic countries is on the minimum level.
Regardless the two different directions of Danish foreign policy, the Minister of the
Foreign Policy, Per Stig Møller in 2003 addressed in the article "European Foreign
Policy in the Making', published in the Brown Journal of Foreign Affairs, that since
the end of the cold war, the objectives of Danish foreign policy are: Promoting the
international peace and stability with enhancing the values of democracy and human
rights; endorsing economic growth and sustainable development and it focuses on
combating the global risks such as immigration and terrorism and the last objective is
fostering integration with 'neighbouring areas'(Carlsen and Mouritzen 2004.)
The main purpose of Denmark is to play a proactive role in the international area and
to exert more influence in the international and regional organizations to overcome its
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small size. Thus it involves in various military and development operations around the
world.
Africa is a space where Denmark deploys its capabilities and influence. To attain the
objective of promoting peace and stability; Denmark has participated in the UN peace
troops after the end of the cold war. For instance, Denmark led the initiative of UN to
establish a rapid force in Rwanda in 1994 and it sent observers to DRC. Further,
Denmark has provided assistances to African arrangements to prevent conflict and
build peace; in 1997 it assisted the SADC in conflict management (Ståle Ulriksen,
2007.)
The modest cooperation with the Nordic countries has been emerged in the African
continent. Denmark was out of the scene when other Nordic countries (Sweden,
Finland and Netherlands) sent their assistances to African countries under the conflict
of Congo in 1960 while Denmark has participated effectively in the NATO operations
in the East of Africa to counter terrorism (Ståle Ulriksen, 2007.)
Regarding the role of good partner, Danish development assistance has exceeded the
international commitment. Generally, it is committed to provide assistances to African
countries and it declared that in 2004 during the G8 summit on Africa and the UN
World Summit on Development Goals.
The Danish government determined three main objectives toward Africa in 20072011 stated in its Africa Strategy (Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007);
they are:
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1- Promoting African responsive to the challenges of globalization which are
relevant to Danish security and interests; particularly migration, trade relations
and conflict.
2- Fostering the economic cooperation between Africa and the EU.
3- Allocating more aid in effective way to African countries with focusing on
vulnerable people.
The Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen in his speech delivered in the
occasion of the visit of the American president George W.Bush in Denmark in 2005
highlighted the main priority areas of Danish aid in Africa: health caring with
focusing on fighting HIV/AIDS; trade relations; conflict management and good
governance (Hvidt and Mouritzen, 2006.)
2.2.2 The Danish Aid Policy
Denmark illustrates its contribution in development cooperation to the poor countries
including Africa as a 'humanitarian responsibility'.
Danish aid disbursements was institutionalized in 1963 by establishing DANIDA as
an independent entity to manage development assistance. Since the 1990, it is
affiliated to the ministry of foreign affairs and it is headed by The Minister for
Development Cooperation. Four legal acts organize Danish development assistance;
the fundamental act issued in 1998 then the supplementary acts declared; two in 2002
and the last one in 2006* (DANIDA website.)
Fighting poverty is the main target of DANIDA mission and throughout 50 years it
has channeled a lot of disbursements that exceeds the international commitment of

*

The acts are available only in Danish language thus I could not interpret them.
68

0.7% of GNI. It could be noted that the priorities of Danish aid are drawn on the
political and economic risks and the opportunities of globalization. Though
development assistance is usually direct to human development goals, Denmark
declared after the end of the cold war that its aid disbursements would have political
goals mainly in conflict prevention and building democracy (DANIDA, 2003). These
political goals have been intensified after the 9/11 attack in the USA which was
followed by NATO military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq to fight terrorists.
The government publishes every four years The Government’s Vision for New
Priorities in Danish Development Assistance that determines the objectives and
approaches of aid allocation.
Five development priorities had been set for the period from 2004- 2008; poverty
reduction is the highest priority; human rights, democratization and good governance;
stability, security and the fight against terrorism; refugees, humanitarian assistance;
environment protection and social and economic development (DANIDA, 2003.)
The following agenda that covered the period from 2005 to 2009 continued the
emphasis on the main priorities in the areas of fighting poverty and improving the
conditions of the poor focusing on the health sector and fighting the epidemic diseases
particularly HIV/AIDS and adopting the international initiatives on environment.
However economic development would be approached through increasing the
capability of private sector to be able to access to the Danish market. Fighting
terrorism with focusing on Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan where the NATO operations
had been a focal intervention areas; in addition to promoting equality and
democratization in the Middle East countries (DANIDA, 2004). Because this
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document was published after the G8 summit on Africa, providing economic relations
with Africa took eminent space in the strategy.
The Danish Development Assistance 2006-2010 approached its priorities through
enabling the poor countries to benefit from globalization opportunities and to
overcome challenges. The tool is promoting the role of the EU and UN agencies as
the essential partner in the development cooperation; further environment security
human rights and democracy had been retained the same focus areas (DANIDA,
2005.)
In 2008, Danish government initiated the Africa commission to share development
visions and plans under the global recession between Denmark and African countries.
The outcome of the commission was published in a report in 2009. The report argues
that Africa is facing economic and financial crises; however, it should maximize its
opportunities from globalization dynamics through attracting investment with
enhancing the agriculture business. Deepening the rule of law and improving the
status of women and other vulnerable have to be embedded in any adopted reform
processes. On the other side, private sectors and entrepreneurs have to participate in
planning and implementing development policies (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Denmark, 2009.)
The commission determined 5 main initiatives to foster the economic growth
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2009):
1- Improving the capacity of African enterprises to be able to compete in the
global market.
2- Developing the financial systems particularly a predictable regulatory
framework in African countries to improve the business environment.
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Therefore an African Guarantee Fund would be founded to be a pool of
resources needed by the starting up enterprises.
3- Creating job opportunities for youth through encouraging entrepreneurship
and self employment; in this regard, the ILO would provide the technical
assistance.
4- Securing the sustainability of electricity and other resources needed to run
growing businesses.
5-

Improving the quality of education mainly the vocational education to supply
the rising enterprises.

According to these five initiatives, Denmark and donors would allocate their
assistances as long as African governments are committed to good governance
principles (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2009.)
'Make Africa free aid continent' was stated in the report as an intended goal of African
countries and Denmark would assist them to attain this goal. Therefore, the report sets
recommendations to pave the African aid independency (Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Denmark, 2009); they are drawn on three pillars:
1- Economic pillar: deepening the role of the private sector mainly in the
agriculture sector because flourishing this leading economic sector could
enable African countries to meet the MDGs; with reshaping the relation
between the private and public sectors in a way that benefit the intended
economic growth. Additionally, encouraging the regional integration and
South -South cooperation.
2- Political pillar: Promoting the implementation of governance principles in
addition to ensuring the participation of all stakeholders in planning
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development strategies. Also ensuring the role of women in development
process.
3- Environment pillar: Protecting environment through embedding quality
standards in the new industries.
2.2.3 Harmonization policies
Aid effectiveness as a goal of Danish aid is mentioned in the documents of the
priorities of development assistance implicitly. The priorities that have been set after
the Paris declaration have not discussed aid effectiveness in details. Though, this part
will try to interpret what have been mentioned in the government documents and to
correlate that to the principle of harmonization including the relation with other
donors; areas of focus and aid modality.
Regarding the relation with other donors, Denmark emphasizes on its cooperation
with bilateral donors rather than multilateral organizations; however, the cooperation
is conditional. For multilateral organizations, it intends to increase the cooperation
with the UN agencies for instance but only with agencies that have good performance
and impact and have the same priorities; for example in 2004-2008 it allocated aid
disbursements to the UN agencies service in health and population policy (DANIDA,
2003). Above that, it decreased the amount of aid to the multilateral organizations and
redirected to the new program implemented by the government. (DANIDA, 2005). On
the other side, it claimed that the multilateral organizations have the responsibilities of
developing common values and principles managing the cooperation among donors in
that case Denmark would assist organizations to reform their systems and to be more
inclusive.
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The relation with other donors is determined by 'like minded' donors and the priority
of cooperation is with European countries. It is stated 'we need to cooperate with the
Nordic countries and like-minded EU Member States that share our attitude to
development policy and strengthen the coherence between Europe’s external efforts
and the common development policy formulated' (DANIDA, 2003, p.5.)
Accordingly, the cooperation is conditioned on sharing common priorities and
approaches; further, it urges the PRSP to be the common objective that donors could
draw their joint strategies; action plans and joint procurement policy (DANIDA,
2004; 2005.)
Using decentralization in administrating its country offices is one of attributes of
Danish aid and this action could foster harmonization on the field because it
empowers the staff in the field to be able to take decision moreover, it provides them
with guidelines to facilitate the implementation on the ground (DANIDA, 2003). In
this regard, it is reported for the OECD that the 73% of staff in the field offices and
27% are in the head quarters (OECD 2009.)
According to the OECD surveys on the progress toward the Paris Declarations;
Denmark achieved the target of joint missions by 34% in 2005 and 44% in 2007 and
regarding the Joint country analytical work, it conducted that by 80% in 2005 and
85% in 2007. While it is on track regarding using common arrangements, it reached
60% in 2005 and 2007 (OECD, 2011b.)
Though its implicit performance in harmonization, it blames donors as their
procedures and requirements are not harmonized and that increase the burden on the
developing countries (DANIDA, 2004). As a part of proactive role in development
cooperation, it initiated in 2005 to establish a high-level forum to stimulate donors to
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harmonize their activities (DANIDA, 2004). On the other side, it welcomes the
cooperation with new donors but it limits this cooperation to exchange lessons only
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2010.)
Regarding the focus areas, attaining MDGS is the target of Danish aid; on the other
hand, aid is allocated to assist African countries facing the global economic
challenges with emphasis on the vulnerable people such as women and youth.
However the driving mechanism to meet development goals is private sector thus it
directs disbursements to this sector.
Geographically; its approach is to concentrate on small countries but to proliferate its
programs to cover different sectors. For instance, in 2001, it had 18 country offices
this number decreased to 13 offices by the end of 2008. However, recipient country
has to be serious about political and economic reforms to be selected. Selection
countries is based on three criteria though Denmark admits it is political choice by the
end: 1) development need; the degree of poverty and vulnerability within the country;
2) the instability and conflict within the country or surrounding countries; 3) the
ability of Danish aid to achieve impact and visible results, that is based on its
competence comparing to other donors; techniques of involvement such as division of
labor and the degree of involvement which is affected by the capacity and the quality
of recipient government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2010.)
Concerning the aid modality; Denmark is committed to reduce the tied aid (DANIDA,
2003). While using the sector wide approach is unreached because it allocates aid
according to the priorities not sectors; for example, promoting the role of private
sector in agriculture is a priority thus it allocates aid based on one priority not on two
different sectors (OECD, 2011b.)
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Regarding the budget support, Denmark allocates only 25% of the total disbarments
until the recipient government guarantees the quality of its financial and
administrative systems (OECD, 2009.)

In 2005, Denmark adopted the tool of

'commitment budgeting' in order to predict the activities and operations that
implemented by DANIDA (DANIDA, 2005); however, the budget plans are
overlapped; for example, there are two development assistance budget documents one
covers the period (2009-2013) and the second covers the (2010-2014).
2.3 British and Danish commitments to the international and regional declarations
Both the UK and Denmark are committed to the international decelerations on aid
effectiveness. Though they have been interested to allocate their disbursements
effectively in order to decrease the transaction costs, their commitments to all
principles of aid effectiveness have been included apparently in their documents on
aid policy after the 2005. On the other side, they have participated in all surveys
conducted by the OECD and they have met the targets by 2010.
However their commitments to the EU policies on aid effectiveness are different. In
principle both admit the significant role of the EU as a main multilateral donor and its
considerable development impacts in developing countries. The UK has translated
this acknowledgement into action; it has allocated about 30% of its ODA to the EU
institutions (DFID, 1997); moreover, it admits that the EU has a comparative
advantage in planning and financing MDGs programs and projects and in cases of
fragile states therefore it has channeled its disbursements through the EU institutions
(DFID, 2009.)
On the contrary, Denmark has perceived the EU as a domain where it could project its
capabilities to the international arena; accordingly, it has deepened its position in the
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EU through embedding its development plans into the EU strategy and promoting the
division of labour among member states in order to influence the other countries
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2010). More important, Denmark has not
allocated its disbursements unless the donor organization shares the same
development targets.
Apart from the international and regional commitments, the Nordic countries and the
UK are formed the NORDIC plus. Through this regional arrangement the UK and
Denmark share their aid policies. NORDIC plus has produced different toolkits and
guidelines to facilitate harmonization among member donors. delegated cooperation;
Joint Assessment of Agencies; Joint-Financing Arrangements in Programme Support
and Joint Procurement Policy are four aspects of the mutual harmonization. The
progress in this regard has been limited to preparing guidelines and determining the
reporting systems as no progress report has been released to demonstrate the
performance of member countries.
Bertil Odén (2011) explained through different incidents that Denmark has not been
committed to the Nordic countries as it usually prioritizes its national interests.
Overall, there is no consensus among Nordic countries on development cooperation.
On the other side, Odén demonstrates the Nordic model in delivering aid; focusing on
the low income countries; supporting the UN agencies and large share of grant aid.
The British aid policy has not had the same characteristics until 2004, when it
reaffirmed on its commitments to the poorest countries; above that, its aid
disbursement has not reach the international commitment unlike the Nordic countries.
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To sum up, the Nordic countries have a significant role in translating the international
commitments on aid harmonization into action via developing guidelines; however,
they do not develop a mechanism to oversee the applications on the ground.
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CHAPTER III
THE AID POLICY OF RECIPIENT COUNTRIES
This chapter will tackle the reaction of recipient countries to the applied aid policies
of donors. It will discuss the pace of development and the role of foreign aid in
financing the development strategies; then it will show the change and continuity in
the received aid amount and modality and how the recipient countries manage the
negotiation with donors.
3.1 Tanzanian Development and Aid Policies
3.1.1 The pace of development:
Tanzania is one of African countries that designed its model of development after the
independence in 1961. Julius Nyerere led the independence battle then he became the
national leader and the first president of the state. He believed in socialism and
emphasized on the role of farmers driving the development process. Axiomatically,
Nyerere did not believe in the Western interventions thus he was not eager to depend
on the Western aid in building the new state and funding the development projects.
Notwithstanding the beliefs of the national leader regarding the new state, the first
development plan after the independence in 1961-1964 was drawn by Britain. The
plan focused on building the industrial sector to substitute imports in order to increase
the national production. The second development plan from 1964 to 1969 was
formulated by British as well and it aimed to encourage national industries and
production with focusing on agriculture sector. The performance of the economy was
stable and the rate economic growth was 2%. Nyerere did not reject the Western
intervention at the beginning but he limited it to support the modernization of
machines used in the agriculture, the lead sector of economy and development
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processes; further, he tried to dominate the structure of production (Kjell Havnevik,
2010.)
In 1967, the Nyerere's development model was applied. 'Arusha Declaration' is a
socio- economic model where the village is the core of development and the rural
economy is the driving force of development and the state dominates the all means of
production. Nyerere thought that the capitalist relation between who haves and
employees does not fit with the traditional African society thus his model fights the
fundamental elements of capitalist 'individual tenure' (Havnevik, 2010.) Gradually, a
socialist state had been consolidated as all enterprises and sectors had been
nationalized and the state monopolized the production. Western powers and BWIs
supported this model because its socialist base was compatible with political ideology
of donor countries at that time in addition to the strategic location of Tanzania
(Samuel M Wangwe, 1997). However this model was not sustained as a successful
model; there were internal and external impediments. Internally, the spread of
illiteracy and the inefficiency of the public administration due to corruption; above
all, the low productivity of the agriculture sector led to instability of the national
economy. Externally, the model was faced by donor conditionality and the lack of
support; additionally, the dependence on techniques and human resources imported
from donors, delayed the development of the national human resources all of that was
combined by Nyerere's refractoriness against IMF and WB dictations. In order to
rescue this model, the Tanzanian government declared the national Economic
Survival Programme in 1981-1982 (Robert J. Utz, 2007 and Planning Commission,
n.d.)
After Nyerere left the power in 1985, the structural adjustment program was
implemented according to the neo liberal bases. The "Economic Recovery
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Programme" 1986-89 (ERP) applied with the attainment of liberalizing internal and
external trade, unifying the exchange rate, reviving exports, stimulating domestic
saving, and restoring fiscal sustainability and mobilizing the local resources. In 1989
the second phase of adjustment program "Economic and Social Action Programme"
(ESAP) was adopted and it directed to the bank sector; public administrations and
modifying the legislations and regularities to foster privatization (Arne Bigsten and
Anders Danielsson, 1999.)
The Structural Adjustment program did not accomplish a visible progress due to the
spread of corruption in the public sector, income inequality and regional disparities in
gaining the output of reform. The WB responded to that deficits by applying the
Priority Social Action Programme (PSAP)' aiming at providing social services to the
poor (Bigsten and Danielsson, 1999.)
Consequently, a new development plans was formulated in 1995 under the leadership
of the new president Benjamin Mkapa. It emphasized on diminishing the intervention
of the state in the agriculture sector with improving its trade relations with
neighboring countries in the east of Africa. The result was the increase of the national
economic growth rate to 5.2% from 1998 to 2003 (Utz, 2007.)

The goal of the successor national development plan that formulated in 1997 was
social development based on the cooperative society that was formulated under the
Arusha model. It aimed to distribute the economic gains to all segments of the society
therefore the components of the plan were education, health care and women
participation (The United Republic of Tanzania, 1997.)

With adopting the HIPC, the first national strategy for poverty eradication was
designed in 1998 and it aimed to decrease the poverty to 50% by 2010 and the
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absolute eradication by 2025. This strategy set the framework of the group of
initiatives that targeted poverty eradication and the participation of local communities,
women and other stakeholders in planning and implementing. The strategy attained to
achieve 8- 10% economic growth annually (The United Republic of Tanzania, 1998.)

Before the new millennium, in 1999 the Tanzanian government proclaimed a long
term national development strategy entitled Vision 2025 (Planning Commission, n.d.);
the pillars of development are:
•

Increasing the quality of live through providing a secured and sustainable
access to the basic needs: food and water, primary education and health with
emphasis on women equality

•

Promoting the elements of good governance; basically fighting the faces of
corruption and ensuring the rule of low. Additionally, encouraging political
participation and embedding the insights of all stakeholders in development
plans.

•

Strengthening the national economy and increasing its competiveness thus the
growth rate has to be 8% annually by 2025; the inflation be decreased and
local development be thrived.

The later national development plans have been inspired by the Vision 2025 and have
met the requirements of the poverty reduction papers (PRSPs). The objectives of the
PRSP that designed in 2000 are: reducing income poverty, improving human
capabilities, containing extra vulnerability among the poor. And that guided by the
principles of decentralization and participation of grassroots (The United Republic of
Tanzania, 2000a.)
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In 2004, the Tanzanian government proclaimed a distinct national development plan
inspired by Asian development model and it targeted annual growth rate form 5-6 to
8-10%. The plan focused on foreign direct investment as a driver of development and
creating special economic zones. Thus the government would reform banking system
and improve the infrastructure to attract the foreign investments (The United Republic
of Tanzania, 2004.)

The strategy of the 2005 aims at equal distribution of the growth; social protection to
vulnerable people and accountability to combat corruption. The stability of economy
and efficient institutions are determined the core of poverty reduction strategy (The
United Republic of Tanzania, 2005.)

3.1.2 Funding the national development plans

The development plans that have been formulated after the independence were
designed, funded and implemented by the ex-colonial power, the United Kingdom.
While Nyerere built his model on self reliance, his argument is the basic elements of
development are: land, people, good policies and leadership; therefore he suspected
that foreign aid could lead to development. However, to start up his model, he
depended on technical assistances provided by the BWIs and other donors such as
advanced agriculture machines but he insisted to get loans not grants from donor
organizations to limit their interventions (Havnevik, 2010.)

Applying the SAPs did not attract foreign aid at the beginning because the first
application aimed to liberalize sectors slowly thus donors were not eager to send their
disbursements to Tanzania. Only 35% of the expected foreign disbursements directed
to Tanzanian governments. Accordingly, during the 1980s the total ODA allocated to
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Tanzania dropped sharply from US$700 million in 1982 to US$ 487million in 1985.
While with the second phase of SAPs, the ODA increased US$ 1345 million in 1992.
(Mbyoya Bagachwa et al, 1997). However, a drop was occurred and the foreign
disbursements had diminished significantly which was led to 'Aid Fatigue' in the 1990
and each part the donors and the Tanzanian government pointed their fingers at each
others. For bilateral donors and IMF; the high rate of corruption; insufficient of tax
system and the poor capability of government to manage different sectors led to the
ineffectiveness of SAPs. On the other side, the government argued that the
performance of the government had been better than other developing countries,
though that, the requirements of donors put burden on the bureaucratic system 'They
[The key economic officials and ministers] are frustrated by the sheer number of
frequent meetings, reports, and contacts that donors require' (Bagachwa, 1997.p. 5.)
Later by the end of 1990 and after setting the rules of the relation between the
government and donors, the foreign disbursements had been increased and became the
essential source of the national budget. It consisted of 16% of GDP in 1997/1998 then
increased to 24% in the 2004/2005 budget (Utz, 2007.)
However, the vision 2025 stated that the goal is to be free aid country 'Reactivate the
commitment to self-reliance, and re-cultivate resourcefulness and savings culture in
order to curb and overcome the donor dependency syndrome which has led many
Tanzanians into unprecedented apathy' (Planning Commission, n.d., p.17. )

As well, funding the national poverty reduction strategy is based on foreign
disbursements. For example the strategy shows that 13.5% of GNI in 2002 funded by
ODA and most of them directed to social services and economic activities; while
between10% and 30% allocated to debt relief as a part of HIPC (The United Republic
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of Tanzania, 2004). Moreover, the strategy inquired –explicitly- donors to provide
technical assistances to NGOs and enterprises to enable them to provide social
services and to assist the government in monitoring and evaluating the national
strategy (The United Republic of Tanzania, 1998). The share of ODA in the GNI has
not been less than 10% since 2000 and in 2003 and 2007 it boomed to more than 16%
as shown in the next chart. The most of ODA has been going to debt relief; it valued
1,127.45 USD million from 2005-2009 and between 2006 and 2007 4,771.56 USD
million allocated to debt relief (aid flow website.)

(Figure 1) Total Net ODA as a Percentage of GNI

Source: aidflow website

According to reports prepared by Tanzanian governments and the World Bank, debt
relief and implementing neoliberal policies in the financial sector particularly have
contributed in increasing the economic growth to reach 7% in the first decade of
2000s; however, the MDGs progress reports show that the number of people under the
poverty line is increasing and it is difficult to decrease this number by 2015.
Additionally, the unequal distribution of the income between the urban and rural areas
has great impact on development (Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, n.d.)
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3.1.3 Aid Management
Due to the socialist perception of building the state and development after the
independence and the central concept of self reliance, the relation between Tanzanian
government and donors had not undergone effortlessly. According to the national
development strategy that based on Arusha, the government set criteria of foreign aid
allocation that includes: aid must not affect the independency of the state; must not
contradict with assets of socialism and goals of Arusha and must to be delivered in
loans so the government could repay it (Bagachwa, 1997.)
Later, the crisis occurred in the 1990's and led donors to cut their disbursements to
Tanzania. To combat this deadlock, Denmark initiated to form a committee to address
the nature of relation between Tanzanian government and donors and it issued a
report in 1995 called Helleiner's report. The committee was responsible for
determining the rules of ownership and cooperation besides using better aid modality
(Gerry K. Helleiner. et al, 1995.)
Regarding ownership, the report identifies a group of challenges that hinder the
ownership. Donors have not transferred the content and tools of administrating the
project to the government after running it and in some cases donors have maintained
their upper hand on all components of the implemented projects basically in technical
programs or projects that implemented by different donors. Furthermore, the required
reform has focused on economic aspects and ignored the role of politicians in
facilitating the progress of implemented projects. Above that, the conditions have
been suggested and prepared by IMF and WB without negotiating with the
government (Helleiner. et al, 1995.)
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Accordingly the report recommends that the government has to design its national
development strategy and to orient the bureaucrats with the segments of the strategy.
Importantly, the government has the right to lead the implementation of all programs
and projects even in the projects designed by donors (Helleiner. et al, 1995.)
The report argues that donor countries and organizations have been the main cause of
lack of ownership because they have been seeking to show that they are the dominant
of the development process; additionally, there has been evident that donors
'manipulate' to select national departments to work with because these departments
have the same development priorities. Therefore, donors have to consult the recipient
government from the first stage and compile between national priorities and donor
imperatives (Helleiner. et al, 1995.)
Concerning donor coordination; the report points to the conflict of interests among
donors and the government. For instance, negotiations have been occurred with
sectoral ministry without involving other master ministries mainly the planning
commission and treasury which led to disagreement; further, there were 2000 projects
funded by only 40 donors and the number of parallel project management systems
have been increased. These behaviors have led to less coordination (Helleiner. et al,
1995.)
The recommendations for donors are to decrease the parallel project management
systems; to share information about their aid polices and priorities including debt
relief; to hold joint consultative meetings to decrease the transaction costs and to
promote the coherence between their aid and investment policies. Regarding the
conditions and aspects of reform, they will be led by IMF and the government has to
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establish an Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee (IMTC) to negotiate with IMF
(Helleiner. et al, 1995.)
For the government; the government has to improve the capacity of bureaucrats and
the key ministries of planning and budget have to develop guidelines for ministries to
guide them in negotiation (Helleiner. et al, 1995.)
Concerning the aid modality, the report recommends that donors have to inform the
government with the total disbursements directed to the country whether they will
allocate to the national budget or channel to other non governmental entities. The
report encourages donors to increase the aid allocation to sector or subsector rather
than projects. Further, any disbursement has to be aligned to the national priorities.
On the government side, it has to formulate its development plan for a long term to be
easier for donors to design their aid policies; to improve the capacity of Ministry of
Finance in order to be efficient in determining the real estimations of the national
needs and expenditures. On the other side, the government has to reform the
regulations and ways of collecting and allocating taxes to be more transparent and to
fight corruption by the end (Helleiner. et al, 1995.)
Institutionally, the Planning Commission and the Ministry of Finance are the
government bodies that receive from internal ministries the national needs and
manage the relation with donors. The Panning Commission has been responsible for
negotiating with donors and other stakeholders such as private sector; presenting the
development vision; and monitoring the implemented projects; while the Ministry of
Finance has to prepare the national budget; to manage debt policies and to supervise
the aid disbursements. However, the capabilities of these two bodies have been
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inadequate thus they have focused on applying the regulations without effective
monitoring of disbursements (Bagachwa, 1997.)
With the PRSPs, the Tanzanian government established specialized institutions to
manage aid. In 2000, the Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS) was formed, which is
supervised by the Ministry of Finance, after a comprehensive assessment to the
Tanzanian progress in macroeconomic reform; coordination with donors and
democracy and governance. The results of the assessment showed that the number of
parallel project management systems was high and the procedures of reporting and
monitoring still put burden on the government bodies in addition to the high
proliferation of projects; lack of transparency and accountability; the poor capacity of
civil servants and the foreign consultants dominated the process of planning (The
United Republic of Tanzania, 2000b.)

In order to counter these challenges, the TAS provides five year strategic national
framework reflecting the policy framework, national development agenda, priorities
and the required elements to ensure ownership and partnership. So the rationale of
TAS is to encourage the principle of partnership within national stakeholders and
between the government and donors ' development partners' (The United Republic of
Tanzania, 2000b.) The TAS is replaced in 2006 by the Joint Assistance Strategy for
Tanzania (JAST) to be the next medium term framework that guides the cooperation
with donors. It includes as action and monitoring plans and donors have been
included; there are 19 bilateral and multilateral donors. The JAST focuses on the role
of government bodies to attain aid effectiveness according to the 5 principles of Paris
Declaration. Concerning harmonization, it focuses on promoting harmonization
between the government and the donors (the United Republic of Tanzania, 2007);
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however, it does not explain the role of each donor though it targeted to increase the
division of labour by 2007. It just tackles the nature and structure of the dialogue
between the government and donors (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2011.)

In 2004 another institution was established "The Development Partners Group
(DPG)". It includes 16 bilateral and 5 multilateral agencies. The ultimate aim is to
handle the national arrangements based on the PRSPs, its objectives have been
revised after the Paris Declaration to compatible with the principles of Paris
declaration. Accordingly it aims to ensure sustainable dialogue among donors and the
government; foster the harmonization among donors focusing on division of labour
and lead partner, and lead the monitoring process and evaluation (The Development
Partners Group in Tanzania website.)
Additionally, the Independent Monitoring Group (IMG) was founded to undertake the
monitoring process and the data has been collected from the progress reports and the
OECD and WB surveys. It links the objectives and activities with the international
targets addressed in Paris Declaration.

3.2 Ghanaian Development and Aid Policies

3.2.1 The Pace of Development
Ghana gained its independence in 1957 with a satisfactory economic performance.
Since it had humble debt and sufficient foreign exchange reserves, it was one of
middle income countries in the continent. These adequate economic indicators
coincided with the faith of Nkrumah to achieve development without depending on
ex-colonial powers.
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But, the experience of the sharp fall in cocoa prices in 1965 forced the National
Liberation Council (NLC), which overthrew Nkrumah government in 1966, to get
assistance from IMF to buffer this crisis. NLC government implemented IMF
prescription: devalued currency and decreased public expenditures (Jean Harrigan&
Stephen Younger, 2000 & Yvonne M. Tsikata, 2001). Since this time, the relation
between Ghanaian governments and BWIs and Western donors has been lasting.
In 1983, the president Jerry Rawlings applied SAPs, which was the reference of the
national development plan (Economic Recovery Program 'ERP'). Though Rawlings
had socialist background, he agreed to adopt neoliberal policies for several economic
and political causes. Economically; cocoa production declined because of droughts
and poor agriculture policies. This decline in the main resource of national income led
to cut in foreign exchange reserves and great deficit in trade balance. Furthermore; the
government could not maintain the finance of state- owned enterprises (Tsikata, 2001
& Kwame Boafo- Arthur, 2007). Politically; Boafo- Arthur (2007) argues that SAPs
was the only available exit to face economic setbacks. In addition, the lack of political
opposition alleviated adopting SAPs as a rational reform. So, Rawlings implemented
SAPs in 1983 to survive and after one decade in 1992 he accepted the political
conditionality and held the first multi candidate election.
The ruling government, The Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC)
formulated the Economic Recovery Program according to strategies of SAPs. While
ERP divided officially into two phases: ERP 1 (1983-86) and ERP II (1987-89), some
scholars divided it to six phases (Kwadwo Konadu – Agyemang & Baffour Takyi,
2001) others combined it into three phases (Tsikata, 2001). Regardless of the number
of phases, the ERP emphasized on five areas of reform which are pricing reform,
fiscal policy, structural policies, and institutional reforms (Tsikata, 2001).
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On the short run, the program achieved notably economic progress. The GDP
increased by 5% while the inflation rate decreased from 77% in 1981 to 9.5% in 1992,
and trade barriers and tariffs were simplified and minimized (Tsikata, 2001).
However, by the end of the 1980s, these economic gains fluctuated; moreover,
education, health, and other social sectors decayed because of the cut in government
expenditures. Consequently, the number of Ghanaians who live below the poverty
line increased besides the private sector was not consolidated because of high interest
rates (Konadu – Agyemang & Takyi, 2001).
These drastic effects compelled the government to propose the Programme of Actions
to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD) in 1987. This program
received its acceptance from BWIs and Western donors. PAMSCAD is designed to
reduce poverty through emphasizing on social policies, which were abandoned in
ERP. Hence, it covers five main areas: community initiative, employment generation,
actions to help the redeployed, basic needs of vulnerable groups, and education (Nii
Kwaku Sowa, 2002.)
In spite of this effort to overcome negative effects of applying neoliberal policies,
social conditions did not improve sufficiently. Inequality and poverty extended
around the country (Jon Kraus, 1999); moreover, debt accumulated and Ghana
became among 41 countries of heavily indebted countries due to dependence on
external inflows with limited capability to serve debt (Konadu – Agyemang & Takyi,
2001, Harrigan& Younger, 2000).
After political transition in 1992, the NDC government proposed a national
development plan called "Ghana Vision 2020". The ultimate goal of this plan is to be
a middle income country by 2020 through achieving solid progress in five
development areas: human development, economic growth, rural development, urban
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development and an enabling environment. Additionally, to attain this goal, the
National Development Planning Commission prepared a medium term 5 year strategy
(1996-2000) as a first step (Government of Ghana, 1995.)
Ghana vision 2020 had been challenged by different reasons. Some argue that the role
of the National Development Planning Commission was fragile and it could not
defend the implementation of the plan, while others argue that the plan was not well
formulated and the annual budget did not correspond to its initial objectives.
(Government of Ghana, 2003 and Whitfield& Jones, 2009). However, the foremost
reason is the change in political leader and elite when John Agyekum Kufour (the
New Patriotic Party 'NPP') won the presidential election in 2000. President Kufour
abandoned Ghana Vision 2020 and adopted the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPC) Initiative.
Accordingly Ghana formulated Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS). The first
strategy GPRP I (2003-2005) attained to enhance economic growth with stability
besides improve human conditions. It emphasized on adopting monetary, fiscal, and
trade measures that increase production and facilitate the development of private
sector; in addition, provide basic needs and public services in rural and urban areas.
Thus the GPRS I priorities are: infrastructure development, modernized agriculture
based on rural development, enhanced social services, good governance, and private
sector development. And implemented programs and projects are defined to reflect
objectives of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) (Government of Ghana,
2003.)
The second phase of poverty reduction strategy (2006-2009) designed to 'attain
middle income status (with a per capita income of at least US$1000) by the year 2015
within a decentralized, democratic environment accelerate' (Government of Ghana,
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2005, p. 5). Thus, the name of strategy changed to Growth and Poverty Reduction
Strategy (GPRS II). The main development areas of GPRS II have not changed
dramatically from GPRS I; they are: continued macroeconomic stability, accelerated
private sector-led growth, vigorous human resource development, and good
governance and civic responsibility. But GPRS II gives high priority to develop
human resources through enhancing the quality of education and training and to
modernize agriculture sector.
The current national strategy Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda
(GSGDA) that covered the period 2010-2013 aims to reduce the poverty through
increase the competiveness of the private sector, stimulate the investment in gas and
oil and maintain the improvement in agriculture sector. To supply the economy with
needed components, it has retained to develop the capability of manpower; improve
the infrastructure and the efficiency of civil services (Government of Ghana, 2010.)
3.2.2 Funding the national development plans
The availability of cash crops such as cocoa has secured the required fund for
development plans therefore Ghanaian economy was stable. The national leader
Nkrumah believed in self reliance however he accepted to get aid from the Soviet
Union to counter the influence of the USA and the Western bloc (Harrigan&
Younger, 2000.)
When the price of cocoa had fallen, the SAPs were implemented. Unlike Tanzania,
donors allocated a lot of disbursements to Ghanaian government because of its
adequate performance. The government received about US$ 270 million in 1984 then
increased about US$ 10 million in two years (US$ 385 million) and reached to US$
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480 million in 1990. Accordingly, the share of foreign aid of the GDP was about 10%
in the late of 1980s (Chad Leechor, 1994.)
Consequently, the vision 2020 considers the official development assistance a major
international resource that would provide financial and technical assistance. That
attitude has been translated in the national development plans.
Ghana received about US$770 million between 2001 and 2007 consisting of 25% of
budget revenue and 6% of GDP. Grant disbursement represented 52% of average aid
flows while Concessional loans averaged 48% of aid flows (Government of Ghana,
2008, p.7.)
(Figure: 2) Ghana: Total Net ODA as a Percentage of GNI

Source: aidflow website

The chart shows the constant share of ODA in the national income; there has been not
dramatic change just in 2004 and that is related to debt relief. More important, the
share of ODA has been decreasing to 8% in 2007 and 2008.
What's more, the government launched the Multi – Donor Budget Support (MDBS) in
2003 with 9 donor agencies; increased to 11 in 2008. Donors disbursed about US$278
million to MDBS in 2003 increased to US$ 525 million in 2010 because the MDBS
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represents GPRS objectives and priorities the government commits to implement
approved strategies (Dode Seidu, 2010 & Overseas Development Institute (ODI),
2007).
3.2.3 Aid Management
The Ghanaian government played a notable role in formulating and implementing
ERP. As the government initiated and proposed the development plans both ERP and
PAMSCAD then they were discussed with BWIs officials. In addition; the capabilities
and coherence of Ghanaian technocrats made them lead the negotiation with BWIs
effectively. Above all, BWIs and Western donors considered Ghana as one of
successful stories in the continent; therefore they gave them wide spaces in bargaining
and implementing (Jeffrey Herbst, 1993& Tsikata, 2001). Since implementing SAPs,
both the World Bank and IMF have led negotiations and coordination between the
Ghanaian governments and donor community. (Herbst, 1993& Tsikata,2001). The
government of Ghana under Rawlings was a tough negotiator. (Whitfield& Jones,
2009). This position supported by the weakness of political opposition and the World
Bank behaviors that maintained any economic setbacks to counter any opposition to
SAPs (Tsikata, 2001.)
Furthermore, Whitfield and Jones (2009) argue that the second term (2007) of the
NPP government is seeking to formulate a national development plan funded by
national resources "by letting donors fund what they want and focusing its resources
on what they will not fund, rather than trying to reshape aid to fit its needs" (p.212).
Apparently, the various Ghanaian governments aim to reduce its dependence on the
foreign aid with utilizing the received amount of disbursements.
The government formulated in 2010 the Ghana Aid Policy and Strategy (2011-2015).
This strategy determines the relation between the government and donors in order to
95

reach the middle income country by 2020 after achieving the MDGs. Therefore the
objective of the strategy are: ensuring the leadership of the government in planning
and implementing development strategies; managing aid coordination with sharing
responsibilities; designing the development strategy to be result driven and 'move[ing]
beyond aid dependence' (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 2010, p.16.)

More important, the strategy highlighted first the drawbacks which have delayed the
effectiveness such as less commitment to the national priorities due to inadequate
planning from the government side or donors have insisted to allocate aid according
to their priorities and discard the national plan. Further, the government has not had a
unified system to manage the disbursements and the relation between the master
ministry and other ministries and sectors have not well identified. Donors have been
sharing incomplete information about their polices and disbursements and their
reporting systems have been fragmented (Ministry of Finance and Economic
Planning, 2010.)

To counter these impediments, the strategy determines the rules to employ the
principles of ownership and alignment besides effective managing of allocated aid.
Regarding promoting aid coordination with the government form one side and among
donors from another side, the government is committed to improve its administrative
capacities mainly in collecting information and evaluation. As well, it will lead
regular meetings between the donors and national stakeholders to set the funded
programs according to the national strategy. Generally, the government believes that
to manage the coordination with donors effectively might need to restructure the
techniques of management and in this case it will include non DAC donors. On the
other side, the government will work to persuade donors to provide the government
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with complete information about their budget plans to increase the predictability.
However, in the aspect of coordination among donors, the government let donors to
formulate their joint activities without any recommendations! (Ministry of Finance
and Economic Planning, 2010.)
Institutionally, the Ministry of Finance has been in charge of managing the relation
with donors; in addition to The International Economic Relations Division (IERD)
that includes the unites of debt managements, aid management and technical
cooperation; essentially, it serves as representative of the government to negotiate
with donors and monitor their activities.
Project Management Units (PMUs) are affiliated to each sector and coordinate with
IERD; supposedly, each ministry sent its needs and views of projects to the cabinet
that approved on plans of ministries then directed to the ministry of finance to
negotiate with donors the needed projects. However, donors preferred to deal directly
with each ministry to avoid the process of approval on projects by the national
government thus PMU deal with donors directly (Ernest Aryeetey and Aidan Cox,
1997.)
In addition to the master role of the Ministry of Finance, a group of frameworks and
strategies have been formulated to tackle the cooperation between the government and
donors.
The Ghana Partnership Strategy (GPS) was formed in 2005 as the primary
arrangement combined all donors with the government. Through the annual meeting,
donors with the government set the map of aided programs and projects according to
the national development strategy; determine the harmonized actions and the
techniques of monitoring and evaluation (Ghana Joint Assistance Strategy (G-JAS),
2007.)
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Subsequently, in 2007 a detailed framework was formulated to determine the
responsibilities of the government and donors. This framework is represented in the
Ghana Joint Assistance Strategy (G-JAS) and it aims to ensure the alignment of
donors with national development objectives and priorities which are inspired by the
PRSP in addition to monitor the performance of the governments and donors. The
G-JAS renewed every four years (G-JAS, 2007.)
Furthermore, the government designed distinct frameworks and monitoring groups to
follow up the effectiveness of aid modality.
The government set the Framework Memorandum (FM) in 2003 as a base of
negotiations with donors regarding the MDBS and it renewed in 2008. This
memorandum is administrated by the Multi-Donor Budget Support Group to evaluate
the commitments of the government and its way in managing the budget (Ministry of
Finance and Economic Planning, 2010.)
As well, the Sector Working Groups (SWGs) headed by the government and the lead
donor in the sector have been formed to review the performance and the budget in
each sector (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 2010.)
Additionally, annual review and progress reports are conducted to evaluate the
commitments of each part to the agreed actions represented in G-JAS.

3.3 The Harmonization between UK and Denmark in Tanzania and Ghana
British and Danish aid policies allocate to reduce poverty and their approach is
increasing the economic growth and the role of private sector in development process.
Africa is the destination of British and Danish aid because the poorest countries are
located in this continent.
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Before the new millennium, the UK had not established country office in African
countries while it applied its aid policy through three regional offices; the East, South
and central Africa. Then it has proliferated its offices started by the offices in Uganda,
Nigeria and Tanzania and in 2002 the Ghana and Rwanda offices were established
(Morrissey, 2007.)
Table 1: UK: Total ODA to Sub Saharan Africa, Gross Disbursements
2001

2002

2003

1215.48
1005.23
1471.36
Source: OECD Stat Extracts

2004

2005

2303.4

3826.56

2006

5510.83

2007

2703.22

2008

2536.44

2009

2533.23

The table shows how the British aid increased significantly in 2006 due to British
commitment in the G8 summit in 2005. However, its disbursements have fallen since
2007 due to the global rescission thus it has not been able to meet its commitment to
increase the share of ODA in the GNI by 2013.
Tanzania and Ghana have been the main destinations of British aid flows. The good
performance of Ghanaian and Tanzanian governments in applying economic and
political reforms has encouraged the UK to sustain its aid flow to increase them. The
Minister for Africa, Henry Bellingham in 2010 affirms on the good performance of
Ghana and Tanzania; he says, 'deploying wealth equitably through society will be
essential for prosperity in the long run. In Ghana and Tanzania, with their strong
institutions, they have been able to turn exciting opportunities to turn wealth from
hydrocarbons into benefits that can be shared across society' (FCO website.)
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2010

2953.02

Table 2: UK: Total ODA to Ghana and Tanzania, Gross Disbursements
Year

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Recipient
Ghana

129.22

281.06

121.25

169.55

152

150.77

156.67

168.32

Tanzania

311.66

217.65

220.34

218.88

230.79

254.4

216.66

241.95

Source: OECD Stat Extracts

However the table shows the aid allocations to Tanzania are more than Ghana; what's
more, the disbursements have been increased after the global economic crisis. This
raise might be interpreted as the UK affirms in the white papers that it attains to
allocate its aid to the poorest countries. Tanzania is still one of the poorest countries,
though the high growth rate reached to 7%, the severe poverty is dominated in
addition to inequality of income distribution.
Regarding Denmark, Tanzania was the first focus area of DANIDA after its
establishment in 1963. Denmark strongly supported Nyerere's socialist policies and
the Arusha model, it was explained that 'he [Nyerere] was inspired by the Nordic
model' p. 14, therefore, Denmark sent lot of experts to Tanzania and from the period
of 1962-1975, Tanzania ranked the third recipient of Danish aid (Jesper Heldgaard og
Jeppe Villadsen, 2012.)
As mentioned in the chapter two Danish aid policy is based on concentration on few
countries with covering large development themes. Accordingly it focuses on 25 poor
countries including 13 African countries (DANIDA website.)

100

Table 3: Denmark: Total ODA to Sub Saharan Africa, Gross Disbursement

2001

2002

2003

2004

427.6
396.75
442.16
Source: OECD Stat Extracts

2005

510.41

2006

589.17

2007

749.31

2008

833.63

2009

884.17

2010

838.33

813.73

The table shows how Danish aid has increased extensively; it is reflected the large
share of ODA in GNI as it exceeds 0.8%. Notably there is significant increase after
2005 because of the international interest in poverty in Africa since this year.
Evidently, Tanzania has been major recipient country because of sharing the political
premises and its geographic location near to the Middle East and the NATO
operations in the Horn of Africa; while DANIDA started its operations in Ghana in
1989 and its first intervention through Danish NGO providing educational services
(Demark in Ghana website.)
Table 4: Denmark: Total ODA to Ghana and Tanzania, Gross disbursements
Year

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Recipient
Ghana

56.7

59.72

56.71

66.15

72.13

85.41

88.38

102.04

Tanzania

90.2

95.5

84.82

95.31

90.07

119.24

106.85

129.45

Source: OECD Stat Extracts

Though Denmark in the Africa Strategy (2007) has classified Ghana and Tanzania
with other African countries that received Danish aid as ' the poorest performance
countries', the Table 4 shows a significant different of aid amounts allocated to
Tanzania and Ghana as Tanzania has been receiving large disbursements.
Concerning the focus development areas, both Denmark and the UK prioritize poverty
reduction operations that are designed according to the PRSPs thus there have not
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been great contradictions between the national priorities and donors' priorities.
However, Denmark has deployed its priorities in protecting human rights and
migrations to the Ghanaian strategy and it has employed the East Africa integration in
Tanzanian strategy (Denmark in Ghana website and Denmark in Tanzania website.)
Regarding aid modality, Denmark and the UK have channeled part of their ODA to
the national budget 'multi donor budget support'. Denmark started to support the
Tanzanian national budget in 2001 (Denmark in Tanzania website); however, it
stopped its flows to the budget in 2006 because of corruption (African Forum and
Network on Debt and Development, 2007). While in Ghana, the UK came in the
second rank after the EU in channeling disbursements to the MDBS in 2010 its share
was 35% of the total allocation and Denmark came in the seventh rank after
Netherlands and Japan (National Development Planning Commission, 2011.)
In Tanzania, a part of adopting sector wide approach, DAINDA has channeled its
disbursements to the 'basket fund' with DFID and other bilateral and multilateral
organizations in the health sector; local development program; public sector reform
and the reform of the public financial management. (African Forum and Network on Debt
and Development, 2007 and the Government of Tanzania and Development Partners,
2004.)
On the other side, DANIDA and DFID with other bilateral donors have used joint
funding in programs targeted improving the business environment and monitoring
public expenditure (the Government of Tanzania and Development Partners, 2004.)
In Ghana, Denmark has applied the same approach and it coordinated from 2007 to
2010 with Netherland in managing the fund allocated to water and sanitation sector
and DFID delegated Denmark to lead the operations in this sector.
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Further, Denmark and the UK have coordinated in conducting environment
assessment; preparing joint programs to develop the transportation sector and
economic governance. They have used 'pooled fund' in the programs of enhancing
the capacity of private sector.
Denmark has led the operations in justice sector and it has taken the leadership to set
common financial arrangements in the decentralization program; while DFID has coled with the UNDP the operations attained democracy and civil society. Above that,
DFID has delegated the EC and CIDA in education and transportation sectors and in
agriculture programs (G-JAS, 2007.)
Apparently, Denmark usually takes the driver seat and that is reflected its foreign
policy objectives while the UK prefers to delegate the authority to the appropriate
donor.
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CONCLUSION

The thesis is trying to explore the causes behind the limited implementations of the
principle of harmonization. It examined the international scope as represented in
Rome Declaration on Harmonization; Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness and
ACCRA Agenda. These international declarations have tackled financial and
administrative aspects of harmonization. The Rome Declaration elaborates the
benefits of employing financial harmonization and entailing administrative reforms.
The Paris declaration has been more precise as it sets indicators to measure the
performance of donors and recipient countries. Nonetheless, the commitments in the
international declarations have not been mandatory commitments; donors could
determine the level and aspects of cooperation with the recipient government or
among each other according to their circumstances.

What's more, the new global partnership that will replace Paris Declaration has not
illustrated how this new architecture will monitor the performance of donor and
recipient countries to meet their commitments; further, it has not explained if the new
donors from developing countries will be committed to the Paris Declaration.
Therefore the new global partnership has broadened aid architecture with the
attainment of creating alternative resources for development but without identifying
the techniques of measuring the effectiveness of development. What has been
discussed the rationale of the new partnership and grand principles of the inclusive
partnership and the South- South cooperation; this international approach will return
back the relation between donors and recipient countries before the Paris Declaration.

Concerning the regional policies to manage harmonization, European Union and
African countries have tackled this principle from different approaches. The EU has
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emphasized on promoting coordination among its member states; while African
countries have handled it as a factor in its relations with the external world. African
countries on regional level have not developed detailed criteria to reform their
administrative and financial systems further they have not set guidelines to assist
countries in persuading donors to harmonize their operations.

The second chapter discussed the aid policies of the UK and Denmark; both of them
met their commitments to Paris declaration. Their aid polices as declared in their
strategies have been affected by the Paris principles on aid effectiveness.
Consequently the aid architecture became a determinant of aid harmonization besides
traditional motives of foreign aid
According to the proposed framework to measure the scope and the degree of
harmonization between the UK and Denmark, the relation between them has reached
the collaboration level; however, this collaboration is based on multilateral
arrangements identified by the Nordic Plus and the EU. Both DFID and DANIDA
have online database of their operations around the world; moreover, the OECD and
Europe Atlas disseminate the different financial operations of DAC members. Thus
the relation between the UK and Denmark has exceeded the first level 'consultation'.
On the other side, allocating aid to fragile states became a focus area thus they have
passed the level of cooperation. Through the Nordic Plus, Denmark and the UK
agreed on procedures of delegated cooperation and the joint procurement and that
reflects the level of collaboration.
Regarding the content of cooperation, Denmark has applied different approach in
cooperation. It has not cooperated with any donor just with the ' like minded' countries
and that is appeared in its operations in Ghana and Tanzania, Denmark has hardly
cooperated with other donors and in case of cooperation it has taken the driver seat.
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While the UK has built the cooperation on the comparative advantage thus it has
delegated the financial or administrative authority to other donors in Tanzania and
Ghana. On the other side, Denmark and the UK have shared information and agreed
on financial procedures.
Despite the cooperation in procedures and practices, there are no bilateral agreements
between the UK and Denmark and all different aspects of cooperation in Tanzania
and Ghana have included other European donors in addition to Canada and Japan and
multilateral organizations.
Geographically, Ghana and Tanzania are major recipients of British and Danish aid.
Though the historical ties between Tanzania and Denmark and between Ghana and
the UK, Tanzania have been receiving large disbursements form both donors.
Concerning the division of functions in the recipient countries, the PRSPs have
determined the objectives and areas of intervention; therefore, there is no great
different between Denmark and the UK in targeted areas. However, Denmark has
adopted programs and projects that have been compatible with its aid policy besides
supporting the national strategy. Further, as mentioned earlier, Denmark's policy is
based on concentration on few countries with the proliferation of projects; for that
reason, Denmark has hardly delegated cooperation and it has taken the lead of
harmonized sectors in Tanzania and Ghana as a way to project its influence.
Accordingly, British and Danish aid have not been fully harmonized and when they
agreed on aspects of harmonization, they conducted that on multilateral level; though
trade relation is a critical factor in their mutual relation.
The aid policies of Tanzania and Ghana elaborate how the political will and the level
of economic prosperity could determine the cooperation among donors. The Ghanaian
aid strategy has included detailed aspects of coordination with the government and
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among donors in addition to the responsibilities of the government and donors to
obtain cooperation. This concerted strategy has reflected the capabilities and skills of
the Ghanaian bureaucrats; moreover, there is clear national goal proclaimed in the
national development strategies which is to be a medium income country by 2020.
According to this ultimate goal, the Ghanaian government has been managing its local
and external resources and utilizing the received aid. Additionally, the natural
resources (cocoa and oil) have enabled the government to negotiate better with
donors.
On the contrary, the spread of poverty and inequality of income distribution in
addition to the absence of strategic natural resources have forced the Tanzanian
governments to depend on aid. On the other side, the aid policy has designed on the
five Paris principles not on its national development strategy; moreover, it has
emphasized on the cooperation between the government and donors and determined
the commitments and responsibilities that the government has to meet. The ineffective
role of the Tanzanian government has not reflected the precedence of Tanzania in
formulating the rules of delivering aid in 1995 via Helleiner's report.
Accordingly, the policies and the capacity of recipient countries affect the scope and
degree of aid harmonization.
Regarding the perspectives on African intellectuals, Samir Amin (2009) proposed
'Alternative Development' to delink aid relations as drawn by the Western powers and
institutions. It has five main dimensions: 1) a diversified system of production in
order to start industrialization and the driving forces are state and local enterprises. 2)
Social infrastructure to promote health and education; here, technical aid could afford
reasonable impact. 3) Regional cooperation that reflected national needs and priorities
not the liberal globalization. 4) Rural and agriculture development to secure food
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production; however, Amin asserts that rural not urban development and farmers
prosperity should be the ultimate goal of development. 5) Delinking external
dependency through building regional institutions such as regional monetary funds;
promoting regional markets and utilizing regional natural resources.
While Tandon (2009) developed a strategy to end aid dependency that focusing on
economic dynamics in the state. The strategy consists of sequential seven steps:
1- Adjusting the mindset to reorient power relations: 'psychological liberation' of
whole nation is a core component to define the best way to cut aid
dependency.
2- Budgeting for the poor not for the donors: adopting bottom –up approach in
planning the national budget in order to reflect the poor needs and priorities
not donor agenda.
3- Putting employment and decent wages upfront: providing labor force in rural
areas with advanced training, technology, financial resources and adequate
social protection policies.
4- Creating the domestic market and owning domestic resources: develop 'a
domestic demand – led strategy' to ensure food and energy security and to
improve laws and regulations of land property, wages and tariffs.
5- Plugging the resource gape: decrease externalized expenditure to increase

savings then cancel the resources gap.
6- Creating institutions for investing national savings: develop the physical and

social infrastructure to facilitate domestic investment; in addition to
strengthening financial national institutions namely the central banks.
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7- Limiting aid to national democratic priorities: confining donors' intervention

in national political structure through their calling for democratic governance
and monitoring and evaluating national practices.
Tandon argues that adopting this strategy will not end aid disbursements from the North to the
South but it will restructure the bases of aid relation with essential emphasis on national needs
and priorities.

To end 'aid colonization', Murithi (2009) believes in regional integration accompanied
with democratic governance to improve the state capacity in mobilizing and allocating
its resources. On the other hand, he supports the notion of 'ethical aid' when aid
allocated in transparent and integrated manner. Community participation in
formulating fields of aid allocation is essential to aid decolonization.
Dr. Talaat Abdel-Malek (personal communication, May 17, 2012) the co-chair of the
OECD Working Party on Aid Effectiveness asserts that the capability of the recipient
country determines the scope and the level of aid effectiveness. To lead harmonized
operations, the recipient country has to formulate well defined development strategy;
determine the national resources and the amount of supplementary resources from
ODA; determine the comparative advantage of each donor; apply effective monitoring
system and conduct comprehensive evaluation shows the responsibilities of each part.
Dambisa Moyo, in her prominent book 'Dead Aid' (2009), urges for decreasing aid
gradually and utilizing it. Her proposal to 'dead aid' is more likely to the idea of the
new global partnership, she recommends fostering the regional trade; attracting the
foreign direct investments with allocating them in productive sectors and stimulating
the local resources through reforming banking system and encouraging SMEs.
Additionally, she indicates to the significance of political will to obtain this goal.
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The aforementioned perspectives reflect part of the reality and part of solution; Amin,
Tandon and Murithi have well examined the current aid architecture; identified
drawbacks and criticized its components. However, their proposals tackling grand
good principles without developing actions under each principle further they have
disregarded the role of political elite as a prerequisite to implement suggested
strategies. I think it is worth to discuss how to limit the corruption of political elite
and to convince them with the new paradigm of aid relation or 'adjusting the mindset'
as Tandon argues. Additionally, they did not handle the procedures of fostering
regional integration.
On the contrary, Dr. Abdel-Malek and Moyo developed their perspective from the
current situation. Dr.Abdel – Malek has tried to refine the current architecture through
confirming on increasing the ability of developing countries in negotiations with
donors to adopt their needs and priorities. While, Moyo suggests mechanisms to
empower the poor in the developing countries and utilize the received aid. However, I
disagree with her and with other scholars who perceive China and India the best
alternative to traditional donors. The scholars' arguments are built of the legacy of
Africa is a poor country and need the others solidarity.
My point of view is the African perspective to end aid dependency needs more
development to entail well defined minor actions and tools under each principle to
implement it and to modify the current aid relation gradually. That is what donor
countries and institutions have been doing they are focusing on developing minor
indicators to convince the public opinion with their goals.
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